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Abstract 
We exploit variation in the cultural heritage across U.S. CEOs who are the children or grandchildren of 
immigrants to demonstrate that the cultural origins of CEOs matter for corporate outcomes. Following 
shocks to industry competition, firms led by CEOs who are second- or third-generation immigrants are 
associated with a 6.2% higher profitability compared with the average firm. This effect weakens over 
successive immigrant generations and cannot be detected for top executives apart from the CEO. 
Additional analysis attributes this effect to various cultural values that prevail in a CEO’s ancestral 
country of origin. (JEL G30, M14, Z1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are grateful to Andrew Karolyi (the editor) and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and 
suggestions. We thank our discussants: Christine Brown, G. Nathan Dong, Min Jung Kang, Jillian Popadak, Vijaya 
Subrahmanyam, and Chendi Zhang. We also thank Alon Brav, Barbara Casu, Robert Davidson, Elisabeth Dedman, 
Angelica Gonzalez, Christo Karuna, S. P. Kothari, Piotr Korczak, Ivan Lim, Romie Littrell, Frank Liu, Hamid 
Mehran, Ron Masulis, Kristian Myrseth, Linh Nguyen, Trang Nguyen, Jeroen Nieboer, Neslihan Ozkan, Bill Rees, 
Klaus Schaeck, Ben Sila, Sascha Steffen, and Francesco Vallascas; participants at the 2016 FMA Annual meeting in 
Las Vegas, the 2016 Research in Behavioral Finance Conference, the 2016 Edinburgh Conference on Legal 
Institutions and Finance, the 2016 EFMA meeting in Basel, the 2015 Federal Reserve Bank of New York/JAE 
Conference on the Economics of Culture, the 2015 FMA Consortium on Activist Investors, Corporate Governance 
and Hedge Fund, the 2015 FMA meeting in Venice, the 2015 BAFA meeting in Manchester; and seminar 
participants at Bristol, Glasgow, Lancaster, and St Andrews for helpful comments. All errors are our own. Send 
correspondence to Duc Duy Nguyen, University of St. Andrews, The Gateway Building, St Andrews, KY16 9RJ, 
Fife, Scotland, United Kingdom; telephone: 44(0) 1334 46 2799. E-mail: ddn2@st-andrews.ac.uk.  
1 
 
Do the cultural values we inherit from our ancestors affect our decision-making in the 
present time? A growing literature documents how various characteristics of chief executive 
officers (CEOs) shape firm outcomes (Dittmar and Duchin 2016; Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau 
2017; Cronqvist and Yu 2017; Schoar and Zuo 2017). However, this literature faces 
measurement challenges when it comes to identifying the impact of a CEO’s cultural heritage on 
corporate outcomes. The impact of culture—regardless of how defined or measured—is easily 
confounded with economic and other institutional factors that, much like culture, can vary across 
nations. 
The empirical setting we use in this paper addresses this measurement challenge. We 
hand-collect a novel data set that tracks the family trees of US CEOs and focus on CEOs who are 
the children or grandchildren of immigrants (henceforth Gen2-3 CEOs). While Gen2-3 CEOs are 
exposed to the same legal, social and institutional influences as other US-born CEOs, they 
possess a cultural heritage that is different from those of other CEOs. Specifically, the cultural 
preferences and beliefs of Gen2-3 CEOs are likely to bear the cultural mark of the countries from 
which their parents or grandparents have emigrated. In this paper, we test whether the cultural 
values prevailing in the country that a Gen2-3 CEO’s ancestors originate from shape firm policy 
choices and performance in a changing industry environment. 
To study the impact of culture on economic outcomes, it is central to understand how a 
person’s cultural values are formed and transmitted. Some studies posit that cultural attitudes 
adapt quickly to changes in economic incentives and opportunities. For instance, Gruber and 
Hungerman (2008) show that when the opportunity costs of religious participation increase, 
church attendance and donations drop sharply. Others argue that cultural values are deeply 
rooted and slow moving (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). For instance, several studies document 
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that the descendants of immigrants show a degree of cultural distinctiveness over several 
subsequent generations (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006; Fernandez and Fogli 2009; 
Giavazzi, Petkov, and Schiantarelli 2015). In line with the latter view, our paper documents 
distinct behavior among Gen2-3 CEOs and offers an explanation based on cultural heritage. 
To identify a CEO’s cultural heritage, we hand-collect data on the country of origin of a 
CEO’s ancestors from ancestry.com, the world’s largest genealogy database with access to 
almost 17 billion family histories. Our main approach, as described in detail in Section 1.1, maps 
out a CEO’s family tree. Specifically, we search for a CEO’s family records to identify 
information about their parents which we then use to identify their ancestors. We search census 
records, birth and marriage certificates, and other publicly available information to accurately 
track a CEO’s ancestral history, as well as whether he or she is a Gen2-3 CEO. This detailed data 
set enables us to construct precise tests of the role of CEO cultural heritage on firm outcomes.  
To identify the effect of CEO’s cultural heritage on firm outcomes, we employ a 
methodology similar in spirit to Opler and Titman (1994) and Yonker (forthcoming). Our 
research design exploits competitive shocks at industry-level that are unanticipated by both the 
CEO and the firm. This allows us to circumvent ambiguity over whether CEOs imprint their 
preferences on a firm or whether CEOs and firms match on unobserved factors. The basic idea is 
that an industry shock forces the CEO to make decisions to navigate the firm through a changing 
industry environment. The ensuing decisions are likely to be complex, nonroutine, and 
unstructured, and CEO characteristics therefore are likely to be salient in how CEOs respond. If 
the cultural heritage of a CEO matters to corporate outcomes, we should observe systematic 
post-shock differences across firms led by CEOs with different ancestry.1 
																																																													
1 Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2009) demonstrate that cultural values are salient in how individuals behave in a 
competitive environment. The authors explore gender differences in competitive behavior across two distinct 
3 
Since the banking industry experiences a series of profound shocks to competition in the 
1990s, our study focuses on banks. We use the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
(IBBEA) of 1994 that legalizes interstate branching across the United States and markedly 
increases competitive pressures in some U.S. states (see Rice and Strahan 2010; Cornaggia et al. 
2015). Our identification relies on the staggered (and unanticipated) deregulation of interstate 
branching applicable to banks in individual U.S. states. IBBEA therefore introduces substantial 
variation in industry competition along both geographical and temporal dimensions.  
Our analysis of how a CEO’s cultural heritage shapes firm policy choices and 
performance under competitive pressure rests on three main parts. First, we document a 
detectable performance effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs. When competition intensifies, banks led 
by Gen2-3 CEOs are associated with a 6.2% higher return on assets compared to an average 
bank. Intriguingly, when examining the different generations of immigrants that a CEO belongs 
to, we observe a monotonic reduction in bank performance under competitive pressure as we 
move from CEOs who are second-generation descendants of immigrants to later generations. 
Further, the Gen2-3 effects we document are uniquely linked to the CEO and cannot be detected 
for other senior executives, such as the chief financial officer (CFO) or other members of a 
bank’s top management team.  
Second, we demonstrate that the descendants-of-immigrants effect is rooted in culture 
(rather than other characteristics shared by Gen2-3 CEOs). To do so, we trace the performance 
effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs to cultural values that prevail in the country of a CEOs’ ancestors. 
Using a broad range of 16 cultural values from Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010), 
																																																																																																																																																																																																				
societies in an experimental setting: the (patriarchal) Maasai in Tanzania and the (matrilineal) Khasi in India. In the 
experiment, participants can either opt to compete based on their own performance or based on competitive 
performance (i.e., dependent on them outperforming the other participant). The results show that Maasai men opt to 
compete at roughly twice the rate as Maasai women. By contrast, Khasi women choose the competitive more often 
than Khasi men and even more often than Maasai men. 
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Schwartz (2007), the GLOBE Project, and the World Value Survey (WVS), we find that most 
cultural dimensions explain competitive performance.  
The cultural values that enter significantly broadly contrast group- vs. self-oriented 
cultures and how comfortable members of a culture are with uncertain future outcomes. When 
competition intensifies, bank performance is positively related to the cultural dimensions 
Restraint, Long-term irientation, Uncertainty avoidance, and Harmony and is negatively related 
to Individualism, Performance orientation, Importance of freedom, Intellectual autonomy, 
Importance of selflessness, and Patriotism. In contrast, the cultural dimensions Importance of 
income equality, Humane orientation, Trust in others, Power Distance, and Masculinity do not 
explain competitive performance. These dimensions mainly revolve around values reflecting a 
culture’s attitude towards hierarchy versus equality, which, intuitively, should be less relevant to 
strategic decision-making and firm outcomes (see Judge et al. 2002 for an overview of the traits 
of effective corporate leaders).2  
Third, we offer direct evidence that explains the culture-performance nexus. We show 
that a CEO’s cultural heritage is linked to specific bank policy choices. Specifically, when 
competition intensifies, banks led by CEOs whose ancestral origins lie in cultures that emphasize 
restraint, group-mindedness, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation (1) engage in fewer 
acquisitions, (2) realize higher acquisition announcement returns, (3) display lower risk, and (4) 
																																																													
2 Given the large number of cultural dimensions we examine, interpreting the effects of each individual dimension 
becomes a complex undertaking. Further, the results on the individual dimensions suggest that some cultural 
dimensions cluster to represent more general characteristics of different cultural heritages (e.g., the group-
mindedness of a particular culture). Therefore, we employ factor analysis, a common empirical approach to identify 
multifaceted personalities and traits (e.g., Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen 2012; Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos 
2013; Adams, Akyol, and Verwijmeren 2016; Kaplan and Sorensen 2016) and assign the 16 cultural variables to 
more general sets of cultural characteristics. We find that the 16 individual dimensions can be grouped into three 
factors. The first factor contrasts self-oriented with group-oriented values, the second factor contrasts equality with 
hierarchical values, while the third factor is related to assertiveness and autonomy. We obtain similar results when 
linking the three factors (instead of the 16 individual dimensions) to competitive performance. 
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are more cost efficient. Since our analysis traces the cultural heritage effects to more granular 
policy choices, it further explains why culture matters to performance.  
For identification purposes, our main analysis focuses on how a CEO’s cultural heritage 
affects performance under heightened industry competition. A natural question that arises is 
whether culture also matters to performance under a stable environment. We find that, absent 
heightened competition, banks run by Gen2-3 CEOs are, in fact, less profitable than those run by 
Gen 4+ CEOs. This implies that while Gen2-3 CEOs are more effective leaders under a changing 
environment, Gen4+ CEOs are better leaders under a more predictable environment. In a similar 
vein, many cultural values that enhance performance following increased competition, including 
Restraint, Long-term orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, and Harmony, curb performance in the 
absence of competition. Jointly, these results suggest that individual cultures are neither 
unequivocally beneficial nor harmful for performance, but that different cultures have strengths 
and weaknesses that are context dependent.3 
We rule out several alternative interpretations for our findings. First, we address 
identification concerns related to endogenous CEO-bank matching. Unobserved firm 
heterogeneity may simultaneously explain the matching between banks and Gen2-3 CEOs, as 
well as bank policies. Our IBBEA identification already partially mitigates this issue. Since 
banks will not know ex ante whether and when a state opens to interstate competition, they 
cannot plausibly appoint CEOs in anticipation of this event.4 We present two additional tests to 
show that endogenous CEO-bank matching is unlikely to drive our results. We first compare 
CEOs who assume office at least three years before a state opens for deregulation (these 
																																																													
3 This is in line with Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar (2015), who find that different cultures have different value 
implications depending on the specific contexts.  
4 We construct several validation tests to ensure that the IBBEA shock is indeed unforeseen by banks and CEOs. For 
instance, we employ the methodology of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and confirm there are no prior trends in 
bank profitability or risk-taking surrounding the period of deregulation.   
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appointments are plausibly exogenous to performance post-deregulation) with CEOs who 
assume office within three years of deregulation. We do not find any difference in the effect of 
CEOs on performance depending on how long before IBBEA CEOs were appointed. We then 
use a set of exogenous CEO turnovers (arising from CEO death, illness or long-planned 
retirements) and confirm that Gen2-3 are linked to an increase in competitive performance.  
Second, deregulation may not affect all banks within the same state uniformly. For 
instance, out-of-state banks may be more likely to open new branches in local areas with the 
most growth potential, and if banks located in these areas were headed by Gen4+ CEOs, our 
results may simply reflect the fact that these banks face stiffer competition. We address this by 
showing that our results are robust to controlling for county-year fixed effects. This set-up allows 
us to compare banks in the same county and year (which are likely to share the same customer 
base, face the same investment cycle and local competition) that are led by CEOs of different 
ancestral backgrounds. 
Third, we address concerns that omitted variables at the level of the CEO, bank location 
or a CEO’s country of origin explain our results. In additional tests, we control for various CEO 
characteristics (including demographic, career history, and pay incentives), county-level 
variables (population, labor force, income per capita, and religiosity) and institutional and 
economic variables in a CEO’s ancestral country of origin (GDP per capita, life expectancy, and 
the legal system). Our results remain robust to including these controls. 
Our paper contributes to several active research areas. First, our paper is related to the 
growing literature that studies the impact of CEO attributes on corporate outcomes. Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003) identify significant time-invariant “managerial styles” in a range of policy 
choices. Various studies have subsequently attempted to explain heterogeneity in managerial 
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styles with reference to a manager’s physiology (Adams, Keloharju, and Knüpfer 2016), life 
experiences (Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau 2017; Cronqvist and Yu 2017), or career experience 
(Custodio and Metzger 2013; Dittmar and Duchin 2016; Schoar and Zuo 2017). Our findings 
make an important contribution to this line of research, because they can be interpreted as 
evidence pointing to some of the origins of time-invariant manager heterogeneity.  
Second, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that culture is slow moving and 
that the effects of cultural heritage are more pervasive than previously reported in a literature that 
links cultural heritage to personal choices, such as labor force participation or family planning 
(e.g., Giuliano 2007; Fernández and Fogli 2009; Giavazzi, Petkov, and Schiantarelli 2015). Our 
study implies that the effects of cultural heritage go beyond personal decisions and affect entire 
organizations through their effects on various firm-level policies.5   
Third, we document distinct behavior among CEOs who are second- and third-generation 
immigrants, offer an explanation for this based on cultural heritage, and show that this effect 
fades away over successive generations. Collectively, our paper therefore offers novel insights 
into the formation and persistence of an individual’s cultural preferences (e.g., Bisin and Verdier 
2000; 2001; Robalino and Robson 2013).  
 
1. Data and Identification  
1.1 Bank sample and CEO ancestry information   
Our paper studies how a CEO’s cultural heritage shapes banks’ reaction to the staggered 
liberalization of interstate branching that occurs  during the late 1990s and early 2000s. . We 
build a sample of publicly listed U.S. banks from 1994 to 2006 by matching data on commercial 
																																																													
5 In a related study, Pan, Siegel, and Wang (forthcoming) find that uncertainty avoiding CEOs are less likely to 
undertake acquisitions. This is consistent with the results we report in this paper, where we link various cultural 
variables, including uncertainty avoidance to a firm’s acquisition propensity.   
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banks and bank holding company call reports (forms FFIEC 031/041 and FR Y-9C) with market 
data from the Center for Research in Securities Price (CRSP). We choose this sampling period 
because 1994 is the first year in which U.S. states were permitted to introduce regulatory barriers 
to interstate branching and 2006 is one year after the last regulatory change was enacted. We 
then complement this sample with data from ExecuComp, BoardEx, and Edgar DEF14A forms 
to retrieve a range of demographic information on CEOs. This yields a sample of 939 CEOs 
serving 726 U.S. banks.  
To obtain data on the ancestry of CEOs, we use the Census Bureau records, which are 
accessed via ancestry.com, the world’s largest genealogy database. The exact approach we use to 
identify ancestral information depends on when a CEO was born. 
Since the latest publicly available Census Bureau records stem from the 1940 census, we 
can retrieve ancestry information for all 209 CEOs born before 1940 directly from census 
records. 6  Census records contain detailed demographic information on all members of a 
household (including names, birth dates, and places of birth). We start by locating a CEO’s 
census records to obtain information on their parents (and their respective places of birth). If both 
parents are born outside the United States, we classify a CEO as a second-generation immigrant 
from the country in which their parents were born. If either parent is born in the United States, 
we continue to locate earlier census records of a CEO’s parents to identify the CEO’s 
grandparents. If the CEO’s grandparents are born outside the United States, the CEO is classified 
as a third-generation immigrant from the country in which his or her grandfather is born. 
Otherwise, we continue our search using earlier census records as far back as data availability 
permits, usually to the mid-19th century.  
																																																													
6 The U.S. Census Bureau conducts a population count every ten years in years ending with a zero. However, to 
protect the privacy of those who are alive, the census records are only made publicly available 72 years after the 
original census day. 
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For the 730 CEOs born after 1940 (about 78% of the sample), we use two approaches to 
collect ancestry information. The first approach relies on the fact that since all the parents of 
sample CEOs are born before 1940, their census records are accessible. If we know the names of 
a CEO’s parents (via ancestry.com or other public sources), we can map out the parents’ family 
tree and locate their ancestors using the same technique we use for CEOs born before 1940. To 
do this, we search ancestry.com for a CEO’s birth and marriage certificates that occasionally list 
the names of parents.7 If we cannot identify a CEOs parents this way, we search a CEO’s 
biographies, interviews, or obituaries for information on their parents.  
When we cannot identify the parents of a CEO, we use a second approach that lets us 
infer ancestry information where this information cannot be directly sourced from census 
records. Specifically, we can infer a CEO’s heritage if all families with the same surname as the 
CEO and live in the birth county of the CEO have immigrated to the United States from the same 
country and the same number of generations ago.  
The following example illustrates this approach. Say, we search for ancestors of a CEO 
with the surname Pantilione who is born in 1945 in Cumberland County, New Jersey.8 To do 
this, we search Census records for all Pantilione families that live in Cumberland County in 
1940. Census records indicate that two families with the surname Pantilione live in Cumberland 
County in 1940 and that both families emigrated from Italy at about the same time. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to assume that the CEO will be born to one of these two families in 1945 and is of 
Italian ancestry.9 Crucially, if we were to discover inconsistencies regarding a CEO’s origins 
																																																													
7 The level of detail in birth or marriage certificates significantly varies across counties and states.  
8 We identify a CEO’s birthplace from various sources, including ancestry.com’s School Yearbooks, Marquis Who’s 
Who, NNDB.com, LinkedIn, or through extensive Google searches. 
9 This strategy relies on some assumptions. First, the CEO’s family does not move house between 1940 and 1945. 
Second, no new families with the same surname move to Cumberland County between 1940 and 1945. We later 
show that our results are robust to restricting the analyses to CEOs born before 1940 (where all data are directly 
obtained from census records). 
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(e.g., one Pantilione family emigrated from Italy and one from Poland or the families arrived in 
the United States a different number of generations ago), we remove that CEO from the sample. 
This way, we maintain a high level of precision when identifying the cultural heritage of CEOs. 
In total, we are able to find ancestry information for 406 out of 730 CEOs born after 
1940. Combined with the 209 CEOs born before 1940, this gives us a sample of 615 CEOs. In 
subsequent sections, we expand this detailed collection of ancestry data to other senior 
executives to test whether the cultural heritage effects extend to senior executives other than the 
CEO.   
Throughout the paper, we restrict our sample to CEOs where the paternal and maternal 
ancestors originate from the same country and migrate to the United States the same number of 
generations ago. This ensures that the cultural heritage of CEOs is clearly identifiable. CEOs of 
mixed ancestry may have inherited values from either or from both cultures, depending on 
cultural and personal factors we cannot observe. Fortunately, cross-cultural intermarriages were 
not common amongst 20th century immigrants (e.g., Pagnini and Morgan 1990; Kalmijn 1999). 
Fewer than 15% of CEOs are classed as mixed ancestry. In unreported tests, we find that mixed-
ancestry CEOs do not outperform under competitive pressure, consistent with the notion that 
these CEOs do not inherit a cultural heritage that is distinct from the CEO population.  
A major advantage of our approach is that it provides precise information on the 
immigrant generation and origin of a CEO’s ancestors. Several contemporaneous studies (e.g., 
Du, Yu, and Yu forthcoming; Pan, Siegel, and Wang forthcoming) rely on surnames to infer 
ancestral origin which is a noisier approach. For instance, a person with the surname Welch 
could come from Britain, Ireland, or Germany. The drawback of targeting such a high level of 
accuracy in determining a CEO’s cultural heritage is that we lose 44% post-1940 CEOs whose 
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heritage we cannot identify precisely. To account for potential self-selection, we base all our 
regression models on a standard Heckman two-step procedure (1979). This procedure ensures 
that our conclusions regarding CEO heritage and other factors that drive bank performance are 
not driven by unobservable factors that make sample inclusion more likely.10 
 
1.2 Identification: Competitive pressures in the U.S. banking sector 
To study how a CEO’s cultural heritage effects firm outcomes, we employ a methodology 
similar to Opler and Titman (1994) and Yonker (forthcoming). The basic idea is that causality is 
identified through a series of unexpected shocks at industry-level that force a CEO to act. Since 
the ensuing decisions are nonroutine, complex, and unstructured, CEO characteristics, such as 
cultural heritage, are likely to be salient in shaping how firms respond to a changing industry 
environment.  
We use the staggered liberalization of interstate branching in the 1990s, which introduces 
an unexpected and significant increase in industry competition at the level of individual states as 
shocks that are unanticipated by banks (see Cornaggia et al. 2015). The Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 allows unrestricted interstate banking and interstate 
branching across the United States from 1997. IBBEA leads to an exponential growth of banking 
																																																													
10 The first step of the Heckman procedure estimates the probability that banks are included in our sample using data 
on banks included and banks we are unable to include in our sample due to data restrictions. Identification rests on 
the exclusion restriction that requires the first stage to be estimated using a set of variables that is larger by at least 
one variable than the set of variables in the second stage. Because CEOs with longer surnames are more likely to be 
uniquely identified (e.g., Pantilione vs. Mike), the length of the CEO’s surname affects the likelihood that a CEO is 
included in the sample. Therefore, we use the length of a CEO’s surname as an additional variable that is included in 
the first but not the second stage. At the same time, this instrument is plausibly exogenous to bank performance (the 
correlation between the length of a CEO’s surname and bank ROA is -0.03 and is statistically insignificant). The 
first-stage results are shown in Table A3 (see appendix). The second stage of the Heckman procedure (as shown in 
the tables in this paper) includes Lambda, which contains information from the first step to control for unobservable 
factors which make sample inclusion more likely.  
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activities across state borders. While there are only 64 out-of-state banks in 1994, this number 
increases to 24,000 by 2005 (Johnson and Rice, 2008).  
Our identification strategy relies on a unique feature of IBBEA: the ability of individual 
US states to block competition by adopting barriers against deregulation any time between the 
passage of IBBEA in September 1994 and its effective date in July 1997. Further, some US 
states continue to revise their barriers to interstate branching until 2005, providing further 
variation in competitive pressures. The key advantage of our identification is that different states 
enact the roadblocks at different points in time thus giving us multiple competitive shocks that 
vary across states and time. Further, decisions on interstate branching are made at state level and 
cannot be anticipated by individual banks or the CEO. Therefore, IBBEA offers an experimental 
setting to gauge how CEOs react to changes in competitive pressures that are exogenous to the 
bank that they work for (Rice and Strahan 2010).  
Specifically, IBBEA grants U.S. states the option to (1) impose a minimum age of three 
years on target institutions of interstate acquirers; (2) not to permit de novo interstate branching; 
(3) not to permit the acquisition of individual branches by an out-of-state bank; and (4) impose a 
deposit cap of 30% or lower. We define a state as competitive if it chooses not to adopt either (3) 
or (4). This is because banks can easily circumvent the restrictions on age and de novo interstate 
branching or their effects are subsumed to those of (3) and (4) (Johnson and Rice 2008).11 Table 
A1 (see the appendix) lists the changes to the interstate branching rules by state and by year. 
 
																																																													
11 Column (6) of Table A9 (see the appendix) shows that our results remain robust to using all four roadblock 
provisions.  
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2. Empirical Results  
2.1 Difference-in-differences test: Baseline specification  
Our empirical strategy adopts a difference-in-differences (DiD) method to analyze how a CEO’s 
cultural heritage affects a bank’s reaction to a shock in industry competition. This approach 
exploits (1) within-state variation in a CEO’s cultural heritage across banks and (2) across- and 
within-state variation in competitive pressures across time.12 The latter is exogenously created by 
the adoption of roadblocks to interstate competition permitted under IBBEA (Rice and Strahan 
2010; Cornaggia et al. 2015). Our main outcome variable is return on assets (ROA).13  
The following example illustrates our empirical approach. Consider two identical 
banks—bank 1 and bank 2—both headquartered in New York in 1996. Bank 1 has a Gen2-3 
CEO, while bank 2 has a Generation4+ CEO. The state of New York decided against adopting 
roadblocks to interstate branching on January 6, 1997, exposing both banks to a sudden increase 
in industry competition. This allows us to relate post-shock performance differences across these 
banks to the cultural heritage of a CEO. In addition, our identification also utilizes Bank 3 and 
Bank 4, which are both headquartered in California, one with a Gen2-3 CEO and one with a 
Generation4+ CEO. Crucially, California does not experience an increase in competition in 
1997. Therefore, Banks 3 and 4 absorb the general economic conditions as well as differences 
that are specific to banks led by CEOs of a certain cultural heritage.  
We control for several bank and CEO characteristics. First, we control for the size of the 
bank using the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Since the size distribution of 
US banks is highly skewed, we also include its square term, Ln (asset)2, to account for possible 
																																																													
12 Column (7) of Table A9 (see the appendix) shows that our results remain robust to using an alternative 
specification that only exploits within-state variation. 
13 Several recent studies (e.g., Ellul and Yerramilli 2013) use ROA as a proxy for bank performance. Our results are 
also robust to other market and accounting measures of bank performance (see Section 5.4). 
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nonlinearity between the bank size and performance (see, Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)). Further, 
we control for heterogeneity in banks’ balance sheets using the ratios Deposits/Assets, 
Loans/Assets and Liabilities/Assets. We use stock volatility to control for bank risk and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of deposits by state and year to control for state-level 
concentration of banking activities. Finally, we control for CEO characteristics by including the 
natural logarithm of the CEO age and tenure, as well as their square terms. This is to account for 
the nonlinearity between CEO career horizons and his or her behavior (see, for instance, 
Custodio and Metzger 2013). Our result is robust to controlling for several additional measures 
of CEO unobserved and observed heterogeneity. Table 1 reports the summary statistics.  
[Tables 1 & 2 around here] 
Before conducting our multivariate analysis, we confirm that the assignment of banks to 
competitive and noncompetitive states is random (as indicated by the two groups not being 
significantly different). We compare the characteristics of the treatment group (banks located in 
states that eventually liberalize interstate branching) to the control group (banks located in 
noncompetitive states) in the fiscal year before treatment takes place (i.e. a state liberalizes 
interstate branching). Panel A of Table 2 shows that there are no statistically significant 
differences in bank performance (ROA), bank risk (measured by stock volatility and leverage) or 
the distribution of Gen2-3 CEOs across treatment and control banks. Further, treatment and 
control banks are also similar in terms of other key control variables (size, lending, deposit, CEO 
age and tenure).  
Next, we check whether the parallel assumption holds in our sample of treatment and 
control banks. The parallel assumption states that in the absence of treatment (deregulation), the 
coefficient on the DiD estimator is zero. Thus, it requires a similar pre-event trend for both 
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treatment and control groups. Panel B of Table 2 calculates the growth rates in bank profitability 
(ROA) and bank risk (leverage and stock volatility) one- and two-years prior to shocks and find 
no statistically significant differences between treatment and control banks. This suggests that 
the parallel trend assumption is likely to hold. In the multivariate regressions, we further control 
for pre-trends in the data by including state-year trends fixed effects.   
2.2 Multivariate results  
Next, we perform DiD tests in a multivariate framework. We estimate the following model:  
ROAitk = α + β1Gen2-3 CEOit*Competitive statetk + β2Gen2-3 CEOit  
+ β3Competitive statetk + Controls + Fixed effects + εitk,                     (1) 
                  
where t indexes time, i indexes banks and k indexes US states. The dependent variable is ROA. 
Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if the state does not block key dimensions of 
interstate branching between 1994 and 2005 under powers granted following the passage of 
IBBEA (see Section 1.2 for more details on those powers). Our coefficient of interest is the 
interaction term β1 that tells us how the profitability of banks with Gen2-3 and Gen4+ CEOs 
differs under the two different competitive regimes.  
Our controls include bank and CEO characteristics as described in Section 2.1. We also 
control for Gen1 (i.e., foreign-born) CEO to ensure that the coefficients on Gen2-3 estimate the 
performance difference of second and third generation immigrants relative to later generation 
immigrants. Various types of fixed effects are included in the models (such as firm, state-year 
trends, and county-year fixed effects). We also account for the interactive effects of regulatory 
changes on bank performance by including interaction terms between competitive state and all 
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controls in our model.14 Standard errors are double-clustered by bank and year to account for 
temporal and cross-sectional correlation (Petersen 2009).  
Table 3 indicates that Gen2-3 CEOs exert a detectable performance difference relative to 
other CEOs, implying that these CEOs behave differently from the CEO population. The 
interaction term between Gen2-3 CEOs and their competitive state is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. When competition increases, banks led by CEOs who are the children 
or grandchildren of immigrants exhibit a 6.2% increase in ROA compared to an average CEO. 
The magnitude of Gen2-3 is therefore higher than that of important controls such as deposit 
funding or state-level (HHI) competition (each about 3%). Further, the economic magnitudes 
become even more pronounced when we link specific cultural dimensions directly to 
performance in the sections below.  
[Table 3 around here] 
In contrast, the coefficient on Gen2-3 is negative and significant. While an F-test in panel 
B confirms that the net effect of Gen2-3 CEOs under competitive pressure is indeed positive and 
statistically significant, our results suggest that absent state-level deregulation, banks run by 
Gen2-3 CEOs are less profitable than those run by Gen 4+. It appears therefore that Gen2-3 
CEOs are more effective decision-makers when the context of decision-making experiences 
major shocks. In contrast, Gen4+ CEOs may be more effective when the decision-making 
context is more stable. We revisit this finding later and explain it based on the cultural values 
that prevail in the CEO’s ancestral country of origin.  
Our findings hold under different fixed effect models. We sequentially add state and year 
fixed effects (Column 1), state-year fixed effects (Column 2) to absorb all variables that do not 
vary across banks within a given state and year (e.g., investment opportunities or business 
																																																													
14 For brevity, we do not report the interaction terms between competitive state and the controls in the tables. 
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cycles), state-year trend fixed effects (Column 3) to control for pre-trends in the data, county-
year fixed effects (Column 4) to control for within-state omitted factors, and firm fixed effects 
(Column 5) to control for time-invariant firm-specific factors. Finally, Column (6) replicates the 
model in Column (1), but excludes the inverse Mills’ ratio. 
 
2.3 Intergenerational transmission of culture 
Next, we analyze whether the effect that CEOs have on performance varies according to how 
many generations ago a CEO’s ancestors arrived in the United States. The previous literature 
indicates that the values of successive generations of immigrants slowly converge to U.S. values 
(see, e.g., Giavazzi, Petkov, and Schiantarelli 2015). This suggests that the effects we document 
above should be stronger for immigrants of recent generations compared with immigrants of 
earlier generations. Table 4 reports the results.  
[Table 4 around here] 
In line with this expectation, we observe a monotonic decline in the magnitude of the 
effect that CEOs have on performance when moving from first-generation to fourth-generation 
immigrant CEOs. While Gen1, Gen2, and Gen3 CEOs are associated with a significant and 
positive performance under pressure, the coefficient estimate for Gen1 CEOs is larger than that 
of Gen2, which, in turn, is larger than that of Gen3 CEOs.15 This positive performance effect 
disappears when we examine Gen4 CEOs. Thus, distinct ancestry effects are only detectable for 
CEOs for up to three generations. 
 
																																																													
15 We are cautious when interpreting the positive coefficient on Gen1 CEOs as capturing cultural heritage. Since 
Gen1 CEOs are born outside the United States, they differ from second- and later-generation CEOs in more than just 
their cultural heritage. Gen1 CEOs experience different economic, social, and legal influences, which makes it 
difficult to attribute the observed performance effect of Gen1 CEOs to cultural heritage.  
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2.4 The cultural heritage of non-CEO top executives 
In this section, we examine whether the performance effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs extends 
beyond the CEO. Recent studies show that top executives other than the CEO matter for some 
firm outcomes. For instance, Dittmar and Duchin (2016) find that the professional experience of 
the CEO and the CFO each have distinct effects on a firm’s financial policies. Pan, Siegel, and 
Wang (forthcoming) document commonalities in the risk attitudes of a firm’s top management 
team and show that risk attitudes within the top management team shape a firm’s risk taking. 
To test whether the cultural heritage of non-CEO top executives explains how banks react 
to an increase in competition, we collect data on the cultural heritage of the four highest paid 
non-CEO executives across all banks.	We obtain the name, age, tenure, and total compensation 
from ExecuComp (for S&P 1500 banks) and from Edgar DEF14A forms (for smaller banks).16 
To identify the ancestral heritage of non-CEO top executives, we employ the same data 
collection approach we use for CEOs (see Section 1.1). In total, we are able to locate ancestry 
information for 2,462 out of 3,416 executives who are in office between 1994 and 2006. 
[Table 5 around here] 
Our regression specifications focus on three groups of non-CEO executives: (1) The 
second-highest paid executive; (2) the CFO, and (3) the team of the four most highly paid non-
CEO executives. We use the same DiD approach with identical controls as in Equation (1). Table 
5 reports the results. Columns (1)-(3) control for ancestry information on non-CEO executives, 
while Columns (4)-(6) control for ancestry information on CEOs and non-CEO executives 
simultaneously. 
																																																													
16 We focus our analyses on the five highest-paid executives (based on total compensation). Next to the CEO, the 
group of top-five executives typically includes the Chairman, President, Chief Operating Officer (COO), CFO, and 
the Senior or Executive Vice President.  
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As shown in Table 5, the interaction terms between Gen2-3 and any of the groups of non-
CEO executives we analyze do not enter significantly. Crucially, Gen2-3 CEOs continue to be 
significantly associated with higher competitive performance after we control for the ancestry 
information of non-CEO executives. Overall, our results buttress the view that because CEOs are 
the most important decision-maker in a bank, their cultural heritage exerts a detectable effect on 
bank performance in how banks respond to a changing industry environment. No such effects are 
detectable for other senior executives.17 
3. Impact of a CEO’s Cultural Values on Firm Performance  
The previous sections show that Gen2-3 CEOs behave differently from the general population of 
CEOs and that this effect varies across immigrant generations. To demonstrate that the 
descendants-of-immigrants effects are due to culture, rather than other characteristics shared by 
Gen2-3 CEOs, this section traces the performance effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs back to specific 
cultural values that prevail in the country of a CEOs’ ancestors.  
 
3.1 Cultural values   
We obtain cultural variables from four prominent cultural databases: Hofstede, Schwartz, the 
GLOBE Project, and the World Value Survey. In total, we collect data for 16 cultural variables. 
Arguably, any selection of individual cultural variables remains arbitrary to some extent. 
However, our approach of collecting a relatively large number of cultural variables from 
different sources is designed to minimize the effects that arbitrary choices linked to any 
individual cultural index may have on our conclusions.  
																																																													
17 Our findings do not rule out that the cultural heritage of non-CEO executives may shape decision-making in their 
particular areas of responsibilities. However, our results indicate that, should such effects exist, they are not 
traceable in aggregate firm performance. 
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We start with the cultural variables identified by Geert Hofstede, because this framework 
has been widely applied across many disciplines. We use all six Hofstede dimensions: Power 
distance indicates the importance of hierarchy in a culture, Individualism versus collectivism 
reflects the integration of individuals in groups, Uncertainty avoidance is the extent to which 
individuals are not comfortable with unpredictability and ambiguity, Masculinity versus 
femininity describes “tough versus tender” cultures, Long-term versus short-term orientation is 
related to (short-term) normative versus (long-term) pragmatic cultures, and Restraint versus 
indulgence reflects the extent to which members of a society try to control their desires and 
impulses.  
Despite its popularity, Hofstede’s framework faces criticisms notably for its reliance on 
theoretical reasoning to construct a relatively low number of cultural dimensions (see Karolyi 
(2016) for a critical review of the key databases used to proxy cultural values). Therefore, we 
complement Hofstede’s cultural dimensions with additional cultural variables not captured in 
Hofstede’s framework.18 
We first consider the cultural variables developed by Schwartz (2007), who derives three 
broad measures of societal traits based on extensive interviews conducted between 1988 and 
2004. While many of the Schwartz spectra are similar to Hofstede’s dimensions, two Schwartz 
variables capture additional cultural attributes which we include in our analysis: Intellectual 
autonomy versus embeddedness reflects the freedom to pursue one’s own thoughts and ideas, and 
Harmony versus mastery captures the degree to which members of a society are uncomfortable 
with confrontation and assertiveness. 
																																																													
18 In unreported tests, we also contrast cultural dimensions where Hofstede and other dimensions directly overlap 
and find that they explain competitive performance in a similar manner. For instance, regardless of whether we 
measure Uncertainty avoidance using Hofstede or GLOBE, both are associated with higher competitive 
performance.   
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We then add cultural variables from GLOBE.19 Since seven out of nine of GLOBE’s 
cultural dimensions overlap with dimensions already included, we add the two dimensions that 
capture additional cultural attributes: Humane orientation, which reflects the extent to which a 
society encourages individuals to be altruistic, generous and kind to others, and Performance 
orientation, which reflects the extent to which a society encourages and rewards performance. 
Our final source of cultural variables is the World Value Survey (WVS). There are six 
waves of surveys since 1981, and the most recent 2012 survey includes 258 items on various 
topics including perceptions of life, work, politics, and society. Given the comprehensive nature 
of the survey, we start with the 14 WVS items that Karolyi (2016) identifies as particularly 
relevant for finance research and select six items that capture attributes not already captured by 
other cultural dimensions in our analysis: Trust in others, Importance of freedom, Importance of 
selflessness, Importance of income equality, Importance of self-respect, and Patriotism.  
 
3.2 Cultural values and competitive performance   
To examine how the 16 cultural dimensions we collect explain competitive performance, we first 
scale each dimension to a range between zero and one. We then assign cultural values to CEOs 
according to their ancestral background.20 We sequentially relate each cultural dimension to bank 
performance under competitive pressure by running the following model: 
ROAitk = α + β1Cultural dimensionit*Competitive statetk + β2Cultural dimensionit  
+ β3 Competitive statetk + Controls + Fixed effects + εitk,                     (2) 
 
																																																													
19The project was launched in the early 1990s by Robert House, and now involves over 200 scholars from 62 
countries. See https://test.uvic.ca/gustavson/globe/about/index.php. 
20 For example, if a CEO has ancestors coming from Germany, he or she will be assigned a power distance score of 
0.35, an uncertainty avoidance score of 0.65 and so on. 
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where i indexes bank, t indexes time, and k indexes U.S. states. We include controls similar to 
those in Equation (1) and use state-year fixed effects in all specifications.  
Table 6 displays the results for each of the 16 cultural dimensions. Each row presents the 
results of a regression based on a different cultural dimension. For ease of presentation, we only 
show the coefficients on the interaction between the cultural dimension and the state-level 
competition indicator (β1) and its constituent variables (β2, β3). Our main coefficient of interest is 
β1, which tells us how the profitability of banks led by CEOs with different cultural values 
differs by competitive regime.  
[Table 6 around here] 
The results show that most (10 out of 16) of the cultural variables significantly affect 
competitive performance. On a broad level, this confirms our interpretation that the performance 
effect linked to Gen2-3 CEOs is indeed rooted in culture. More specifically, we find that 
competitive performance is positively related to the dimensions of Restraint, Long-term 
orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, and Harmony. In contrast, performance is negatively related 
to the dimensions of Individualism, Performance orientation, Importance of freedom, 
Intellectual autonomy, Importance of selflessness, and Patriotism.  
In general terms, the cultural values that enter significantly appear to broadly contrast 
group- versus self-oriented cultures and cultures reflecting how comfortable one is with 
uncertain future outcomes. Following a competitive shock, CEOs whose ancestral origins lie in 
cultures that emphasize restraint, group-mindedness, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term 
orientation are associated with positive performance effects while a cultural heritage that values 
personal achievements and self-reliance and believes success is linked to individual ability.  
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Intriguingly, many of the cultural values exert opposite effects depending on whether 
state-level deregulation has taken place. For instance, Uncertainty avoidance or Restraint 
improves performance when states are competitive. However, unconditional on state-level 
deregulation, CEOs who come from cultures that score high on these dimensions are linked to 
lower performance. While the strategy literature links leader attributes such as group-mindedness 
to outstanding leadership (Den Hartog et al. 1999) and short-termism to unsustainable 
investment behavior and poor long-term prospects (e.g., Porter 1992; Marginson and McAulay 
2008), our findings paint a more nuanced view. They suggest that the performance effects of 
certain cultures are not consistently positive or negative, but that different cultures have strengths 
and weaknesses that are context dependent.  
The cultural dimensions that do not explain competitive performance are Importance of 
income equality, Importance of self-respect, Humane orientation, Trust in others, Power 
distance, and Masculinity. These dimensions mainly revolve around values that reflect a 
culture’s attitudes towards hierarchy versus equality, which, intuitively, should be less relevant 
to strategic decision-making and, by extension, firm outcomes. Consistent with this, Judge et al. 
(2002) conduct an extensive qualitative review and a metaanalysis of research into the 
personality traits of outstanding corporate leaders and do not list attitudes toward hierarchy 
amongst the traits of effective leaders.  
The effects of individual cultural values on performance are economically meaningful. 
For instance, a one-standard deviation increase in Uncertainty avoidance increases competitive 
performance by 9.4%, while a one-standard-deviation increase in Individualism decreases 
competitive performance by 18.3%. Interestingly, the economic magnitudes of most cultural 
variables are substantially larger than the descendants-of-immigrants effect (Gen2-3 CEOs) on 
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competitive performance. This is in line with our interpretation that culture is the key driver 
behind the Gen2-3 effects. 
In Section 4, we analyze how a CEO’s cultural heritage affects firm policies under 
competitive pressure. However, given the large number of cultural variables and firm policies we 
analyze, demonstrating how each dimension affects a particular policy becomes a complex 
undertaking. Furthermore, the results in Table 6 suggest that some individual cultural dimensions 
cluster around more general characteristics of national cultures (e.g., whether a culture is group- 
or self-oriented). Therefore, we next employ factor analysis to assign the 16 cultural variables to 
more general sets of cultural characteristics and analyze which sets of cultural characteristics are 
relevant for performance and firm policy choices. 
 
3.3 Factor analysis: CEO factor scores and performance 
Factor analysis is a popular approach to summarize multifaceted personal characteristics, such as 
abilities or skills (e.g., Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorenson 2012; Adams, Akyol, and Verwijmeren 
2016; Kaplan and Sorenson 2016). Factor analysis captures the variability among the 16 cultural 
variables and reduces them to a lower number of factors that describe characteristics that tend to 
vary together.  
[Table 7 around here] 
Our analysis extracts three main factors.21 Panel A of Table 7 shows the three factors and 
how they load on individual cultural variables. Factor 1 captures most (54%) of the variation in 
cultural values. Factor 1 shows high positive loadings on Individualism, Performance 
orientation, and Importance of freedom and high negative loadings on Restraint, Long-term 
																																																													
21 The number of factors is determined by the Kaiser criterion that retains factors with eigenvalues ≥1. In our 
analysis, three factors satisfy this criterion (and jointly explain around 80% of the total variance in the cultural 
values).  
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orientation, Uncertainty avoidance, and Harmony.22 Factor 1 therefore describes a person who 
values personal achievements and self-reliance and believes success is linked to individual 
ability (in contrast to a person who emphasizes restraint, group-mindedness, uncertainty 
avoidance, and a long-term orientation). 
The second and third factors have significantly lower explanatory power and account for 
17% and 9% of the variation in the cultural dimensions, respectively. Factor 2 loads positively 
on Importance of income equality, Humane orientation, and Trust in others and negatively on 
Power distance. As such, factor 2 seems to contrast equality with hierarchical values. Finally, 
factor 3 loads positively on Masculinity and Intellectual autonomy. Factor 3, thus, combines 
assertiveness and autonomy of thought.  
Before proceeding with our analysis of how culture affects firm policies in Section 4, we 
first confirm that the three factors explain competitive performance in a way that is broadly 
consistent with the previous results based on the 16 individual cultural dimensions (Table 6). We 
obtain the scores for each factor and then regress these on ROA using our previous DiD 
approach with identical controls as in Equation (1).23  
Panel B of Table 7 shows that factor 1 is negatively related to performance under 
competitive pressure. That is, banks led by CEOs whose ancestral origins lie in cultures that 
value self-reliance and individual achievement are associated with lower performance. By the 
same token, this implies that CEOs whose ancestral origins lie in cultures that emphasize 
restraint, group-mindedness, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation are associated 
with positive performance effects. This is broadly consistent with the results on the individual 
																																																													
22 In line with the literature, we focus on variables with high loadings, that is, those that are greater than |0.3|.  
23 Component scores are calculated using all the cultural variables with their weights based on the component 
loadings. 
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dimensions reported in Table 6.24 In contrast, factors 2 and 3 are not related to competitive 
performance. This is also consistent with the results in Table 6 which show that many of the 
cultural variables embedded in factors 2 and 3 (e.g., Masculinity or Power distance) do not have 
measurable performance effects. 
Between them, the three factors therefore identify performance-relevant sets of cultural 
values. In the next section, we use the three factors to study how the cultural value sets affect a 
firm’s policy choices.  
 
4. Why Cultural Heritage Affects Performance: CEO Factor Scores and Firm Policy 
Choices  
This section sheds light on the economic mechanisms underlying our results by studying how a 
CEO’s cultural heritage affects firm policies under competitive pressure. We regress the three 
factors estimated above on specific bank policies in the same DiD setting as before. We focus on 
three bank policies for which CEOs have major input and which parsimoniously capture some of 
the key challenges faced by banks during an episode of deregulation: expansion via acquisitions, 
risk-taking, and cost efficiency. 
First, we examine how a CEO’s cultural heritage affects a bank’s propensity to engage in 
acquisitions as well as the expected performance effects of these acquisitions. For instance, 
banks may react to increased competition by acquiring competitors, and many of these deals may 
turn out to be value-destroying for shareholders of the acquiring bank (e.g., Schoenberg and 
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	Interestingly, the coefficient on factor 1 is positive and significant. CEOs with a high factor 1 score are 
uncertainty seeking and may therefore pursue a range of short-term expansionary corporate strategies that may well 
help the bank capture market shares. This finding is also line with Pan, Siegel, and Wang (forthcoming), who show 
that firms whose managers have an ancestral background which scores low on Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance 
are linked to various risky outcomes. More generally, finding that the effect that factor 1 exerts depends on whether 
or not deregulation takes place in a state confirms our interpretation that the effects of culture and cultural values are 
context dependent.	
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Reeves 1999). We study a bank’s acquisition propensity by running a regression on the number 
of deals announced in a given year. We study acquisition performance by estimating the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a five-day [-2, +2] event window surrounding the 
merger announcement.25 
Second, the ability of banks to manage portfolio and financing risks effectively is an 
important driver of their performance. Particularly during periods of deregulation, some CEOs 
may pursue overly risky strategies that could lead to underperformance. We use stock return 
volatility as a proxy for bank risk-taking. Third, some banks may enjoy a higher level of 
profitability because they cut costs when competition intensifies. To proxy for cost efficiency, 
we measure a bank’s total expenses scaled by income. Lower values of this ratio indicate more 
economical use of expenses to produce a given level of income. 
Table 8 reports our results. Panel A examines acquisition propensity, panel B acquisition 
performance, panel C bank risk-taking, and panel D cost efficiency. 
[Table 8 around here] 
Our previous analysis shows that CEOs whose cultural heritage loads negatively on 
factor 1 (i.e., whose heritage emphasizes restraint, group-mindedness, uncertainty avoidance, and 
long-term orientation) are linked to higher performance under increased competition. Table 8 
offers some evidence that explains this result. The results show that CEOs who load negatively 
on factor 1 are linked to banks that, following an increase in competitive pressures, (1) engage in 
fewer acquisitions, (2) realize higher acquisition announcement returns, (3) display lower 
volatility, and (4) are more cost efficient. Jointly, this offers an explanation for why CEOs whose 
																																																													
25 We focus on M&A deals that are publicly announced between 1994 and 2006 by US banks. We obtain data on 
bank acquisitions from Thomson Financial merger database (SDC). All deals must be at least $250 million and be 
subsequently completed. We drop all observations in which data are missing or when other major news is released 
on the same day. This yields a sample of 264 deals.  
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ancestral origins lie in cultures that place an emphasis on restraint, group-mindedness, 
uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation are linked to higher performance under 
competitive pressure.26 Factors 2 and 3 do not exert a significant influence on any of the bank 
policy choices we analyze, which is consistent with our analysis of cultural value sets on ROA 
(where neither factor affects performance). 
 
5. Alternative Explanations and Robustness Tests   
5.1. Alternative explanations based on CEO-firm matching  
CEOs and firms do not match randomly. CEOs with certain desired characteristics could be 
strategically appointed to take firms in a direction determined by the board. If ancestry was a 
criterion for the appointment of CEOs, endogenous matching between CEOs and firms could 
bias our results. Our IBBEA identification partially mitigates concerns over CEO-firm matching, 
because banks that do not know whether and when a state will open for interstate competition 
cannot appoint CEOs in anticipation of this event.  
To further alleviate concerns over CEO-firm matching, we conduct two additional tests. 
First, we split our sample into two subsamples: The first subsample contains CEOs who assume 
office at least three years before a state opens for competition (i.e., plausibly before changes in 
competition could have informed CEO selection and therefore, CEO appointment is plausibly 
exogenous to post-deregulation performance) and the second subsample contains CEOs who 
assume office within three years of deregulation. If unobserved matching were to drive our 
results, we would expect a stronger performance effect among recently hired CEOs. As shown in 
																																																													
26 This finding is consistent with the literature showing that culture matters for acquisition outcomes. For instance, 
Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) find that national cultural differences influence merger volume and gains in 
cross-border acquisitions. Similarly, Pan, Siegel, and Wang (forthcoming) find that uncertainty avoiding CEOs 
(which is one of the cultural dimensions underlying factor 1) are less likely to undertake acquisitions. 
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panel A of Table A4 (see the appendix), the effect of CEO ancestry is similar regardless of 
whether a CEO was hired within three years of deregulation.  
Second, we focus on exogenous CEO turnovers to identify banks that experience a shock 
to the ancestry of their CEO.27 Following Dittmar and Duchin (2016), we define CEO turnover 
events as exogenous if they meet one of the following conditions: the departing CEO dies, 
departs due to health-related reasons, is at least 60 years old, or the departure is part of a firm’s 
succession plan (with the date of departure announced in public at least six months prior to 
departure). To identify exogenous turnovers, we read the financial press and the press releases 
associated with a CEO turnover event. In total, 72% of CEO turnovers in our sample are 
exogenous, which is consistent 67% reported by Dittmar and Duchin (2016).  
Panel B of Table A4 (see the appendix) estimates (1) a firm fixed effects panel regression 
on ROA based on banks that experience exogenous CEO turnover during the sample period and 
(2) difference regressions that compare bank performance two years prior to CEO turnover and 
two years afterwards (ΔROA, in percentages). This empirical design allows us to exploit cross-
sectional variation within the subset of exogenous CEO turnovers. In both specifications, we 
exclude the turnover year to mitigate the effects of potential volatility in performance 
surrounding the turnover event. The results show that when a new Gen2-3 CEO is appointed, 
banks enjoy an increase in performance after a competitive shock. These results hold across both 
regression models and offer further support for a causal interpretation of our results.  
 
																																																													
27 We focus on exogenous turnovers to ensure that CEO departures are not driven by poor performance or changes 
in firm policies. For example, if CEO departures were systematically the result of underperformance, any new CEO 
could be expected to implement policies that improve performance. This could add noise to our estimations.    
30 
5.2 Omitted location and CEO variables 
Our Gen2-3 variable may correlate with omitted location or CEO variables. One example of an 
omitted location variable is that immigrants tend to settle in populous areas. If banks located in 
populous areas are more likely to recruit talented CEOs, our results may simply reflect CEO 
talent. To address this, we control for additional location characteristics. Table A5 (see the 
appendix) shows that our results remain robust to controlling for various location variables at the 
county-level: Ln (population), civilian labor force, Ln (personal income), and religiosity.28,29 
Further, omitted CEO characteristics could equally bias our results. For instance, 
immigrant households tend to invest heavily in the education of their children (Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001), and our results could reflect the fact that Gen2-3 CEOs have more qualifications 
than other CEOs. In Table A6 (see the appendix), we control for various observable CEO 
characteristics: whether a CEO graduated from an Ivy League university, holds an MBA degree, 
has prior work experience as a top executive, or has lived through the Great Depression. We also 
control for CEO incentives: CEO ownership (the fraction of shares held by the CEO), bonus 
payments, and risk-taking incentives relative to pay-performance sensitivity (vega/delta).30 The 
results in Table A9 (see the appendix) show that controlling for these additional CEO 
characteristics does not significantly alter the coefficients on Gen2-3 CEOs, suggesting that 
cultural heritage is orthogonal to these factors. 
																																																													
28 Data on local religiosity are obtained from the Association of Religion Data Achieves (ARDA) and data on 
population and labor are from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
29 Interestingly, our results show that banks located in more religious counties outperform under competitive 
pressure. This is consistent with Adhikari and Agrawal (2016), who find that banks located in religious counties tend 
to undertake more prudent policies. In contrast to Adhikari and Agrawal (2016), who focus on religion as a local 
factor external to firms, our paper mainly focuses on culture within firms by studying the ancestral backgrounds of 
CEOs.  
30 The sensitivity of CEO wealth to bank risk (vega) measures changes in CEO wealth to stock return volatility. The 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to bank performance (delta) measures changes in CEO wealth to stock price performance. 
We are grateful to Jeffery Coles, Naveen Daniel, and Lalitha Naveen for sharing their data on CEO equity-based 
incentives online. Please refer to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and Core and Guay (2002) for detailed 
calculation of the variables. 
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5.3 Legal and institutional heterogeneity in the CEO’s country of origin  
The key advantage of looking at Gen2-3 CEOs is that it allows us to hold constant the economic 
and institutional factors that all CEOs face while exploiting variation in the cultural values Gen2-
3 CEOs inherit from their foreign-born ancestors. However, one could argue that the omitted 
institutional and economic factors at the time when a CEO’s ancestors immigrate to the United 
States could drive our results. For instance, immigrants from the United Kingdom could belong 
to different socioeconomic strata than those from Russia (Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee 1994). To rule 
this out, we collect data for a CEO’s ancestral country of origin (in the year 1900) on GDP per 
capita, life expectancy and the legal system. As shown in Table A7 (see the appendix), our 
results remain robust to the inclusion of the country controls. 
In unreported analyses, we confirm that CEOs with ancestry linked to countries with less 
developed capital markets (Germany, Italy, Poland, and Russia) have a largely similar profile 
with those whose ancestry is linked to countries with more developed capital markets (the United 
Kingdom and Ireland). Specifically, there is no statistical difference in age, tenure, education, or 
executive experience between the two groups.  Collectively, this confirms that our results are 
unlikely to be driven by the differences among these two groups.    
 
5.4 Additional robustness tests    
This section presents additional robustness tests. First, we mitigate concerns that IBBEA can be 
anticipated by examining the dynamics of bank performance surrounding deregulation. 
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we decompose Competitive state into five 
dummies associated with five periods: up to, and including, two years before deregulation 
(Before2+), one year before deregulation (Before1), the year of deregulation (Present), one year 
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post-deregulation (After1), and two years and after post-deregulation (After2+). As indicated in 
panel A of Table A8 (see the appendix), the interaction terms with Before2+, Before1, and Gen2-3 
CEOs are not significant while interaction terms with Present, After1 After2, and Gen2-3 CEOs 
are significant. This shows that the shock does not appear to have been anticipated by banks.   
Second, there could be omitted factors, say macroeconomic conditions, coinciding with 
the timing of the shock that also affect bank performance. We address this by conducting a 
placebo test where we randomly (i.e., inaccurately) assign states to the groups of competitive and 
noncompetitive states. If omitted factors were to drive our results, we should continue to find 
significant results even under this random assignment. As shown in panel B of Table A8 (see the 
appendix), the interaction term is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
Third, we study alternative outcome variables. We replace ROA with returns on equity 
(ROE), Tobin’s q and a bank’s exposure to market downturns (via marginal expected shortfall 
(MES)).31 As shown in Columns (1)-(3) of Table A9 (see the appendix), when competition 
intensifies, Gen2-3 CEOs are associated with a higher ROE and Tobin’s q and a lower exposure 
to market downturns.   
Fourth, we address concerns that our data collection process could be noisy. While we 
retrieve the census records for all CEOs born before 1940, we need to infer the ancestry 
information of some CEOs born after 1940 based on their surname and birthplace. We split the 
sample into two groups—CEOs born before 1940 and those born after 1940—and show in 
Columns (4) and (5) of Table A9 (see the appendix) that our results are not driven by either 
group of CEOs.  
																																																													
31 Following Acharya et al. (2017), we calculate MES as the average return for each bank on days when the returns 
of the overall financial markets are in the bottom 5% in a given year. The more negative the MES measure, the 
worse returns of the individual bank when the return from the overall market is low.  
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Fifth, we use an alternative definition of competitive state (#liberalizations), which takes 
into account all four regulatory barriers (instead of just two as in the rest of the paper). As shown 
in Column (6) of Table A9 (see the appendix), our results are robust to this alternative definition 
of competitive pressures.  
Sixth, we use an alternative DiD set-up. Instead of using both within- and across-state 
variation, we restrict identification to within-state variation in CEO heritage. That is, we restrict 
the sample to competitive states only and assign banks with Gen2-3 CEOs to the treatment group 
and those with Gen4+ CEOs to the control group. Column (7) shows that the results are robust to 
this alternative DiD setup.  
Seventh, we test whether our results are driven by the quality of board governance. We 
include board size and the fraction of independent directors as additional controls. Board data are 
from BoardEx, Riskmetrics, and Edgar DEF14A forms. Column (8) displays qualitatively similar 
results when we control for board governance.   
Eighth, banks located in rural areas could face less competition. If rural banks were led 
by Gen4+ CEOs, our results may simply reflect a drop in profitability when competition erodes 
noncompetitive rents for banks led by Gen4+ CEOs. We address this by controlling for bank 
profitability in 1994 (the year before IBBEA becomes effective) and show in Column (9) that 
our key results remain robust.  
Ninth, one can argue that our measure of Gen2-3 CEOs could relate to a bank’s foreign 
operations. Banks with a view to expand internationally could be more likely to recruit a Gen2-3 
CEO. We control for a bank’s foreign operations using its share of foreign loans and foreign 
deposits. As shown in Column (10), our results remain robust.  
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6. Conclusions  
This paper tests a new hypothesis on the link between CEO cultural heritage, firm policy choices 
and performance. To distinguish the effects of culture from those of other institutional and 
economic factors, we focus on U.S.-born CEOs who are the children or grandchildren of 
immigrants. We use a quasi-natural experiment—the staggered introduction of interstate 
branching (IBBEA) —as a source of exogenous variation to industry competition. Our paper 
offers novel evidence on whether and how CEO cultural heritage affects firm-level outcomes.   
We find that the cultural heritage of the CEO shapes the way a bank reacts to a changing 
competitive environment. Banks led by a CEO with immigrant parents or grandparents are 
associated with higher profitability when competition intensifies. However, we observe the 
opposite effects that these CEOs are linked to lower performance when the environment remains 
stable. Such effects are uniquely linked to the CEO and not to other senior decision-makers. 
Further, the effects weaken over successive immigrant generations and can be explained by 
specific cultural values that prevail in the country of a CEO’s ancestry.  
We show that banks led by CEOs whose cultural heritage emphasizes restraint, group-
mindedness and long-term orientation are safer, more cost-efficient and are associated with more 
cautious acquisitions which, in turn, explains the outperformance. Overall, our work is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the culture of a CEO’s ancestors influences his or her decision-making 
behavior, firm policy choices and performance in the present time. However, our results also 
show that the performance effects of a certain cultural heritage depend on the market 
environment in which a CEO operates. Therefore, the strengths and weaknesses of particular 
cultures are ultimately context dependent.  
35 
REFERENCES  
Acharya, V. V., L. H. Pedersen, and T. Philippon. 2017. Measuring systemic risk. Review of Financial 
Studies 30:2–47    
Adams, R. B., A. C. Akyol, and P. Verwijmeren. 2016. Director skill sets. Working Paper, University of 
New South Wales.    
Adams, R. B., M. Keloharju, and S. Knüpfer. 2016. Are CEOs born leaders? Lessons from traits of a 
million individuals. Working Paper, University of New South Wales. 
Adhikari, B. K., and A. Agrawal. 2016. Does local religiosity matter for bank risk-taking? Journal of 
Corporate Finance 38:272–93. 
Ahern, K., D. Daminelli, and C. Fracassi. 2015. Lost in translation? The effect of cultural values on 
mergers around the world. Journal of Financial Economics 117:165–89. 
Bernile, G., V. Bhagwat, and P. R. Rau. 2017. What doesn’t kill you will make you more risk-loving: 
Early-life disasters and CEO behavior. Journal of Finance 72:167–206. 
Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan. 2003. Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial 
preferences. Journal of Political Economy 111:1043–75. 
Bertrand, M., and S. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118:1169–208. 
Bisin, A., and T. Verdier. 2000. Beyond the melting pot: Cultural transmission, marriage, and the 
evolution of ethnic and religious traits. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115:955–88.  
———. 2001. The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences. Journal of 
Economic Theory 97:298–319. 
Carroll, C. D., B. Rhee, and C. Rhee. 1994. Are there cultural effects on saving? Some cross-sectional 
evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:685–99.  
Coles, J., N. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2006. Managerial incentives and risk taking. Journal of Financial 
Economics 79:431–68. 
Core, J., and W. Guay. 2002. Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their 
sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 40:613–30. 
Cornaggia, J., Y. Mao, X. Tian, and B. Wolfe. 2015. Does banking competition affect innovation? 
Journal of Financial Economics 115:189–209. 
Cronqvist, H., and F. Yu. 2017. Shaped by their daughters: Executives, Female Socialization, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming 
Custodio, C., M. A. Ferreira, and P. P. Matos. 2013. Generalists vs Specialists: Managerial skills and 
CEO pay. Journal of Financial Economics 108:471–92. 
Custodio, C., and D. Metzger. 2013. How do CEOs matter? The effect of industry expertise on acquisition 
returns. Review of Financial Studies 26:2008–47. 
Den Hartog, D.N., R.J. House, P.J. Hanges, S.A. Ruiz-Quintanilla, and P.W. Dorfman. 1999. Culture 
specific and cross-culturally generalizable implicit leadership theories: Are attributes of 
charismatic/transformational leadership universally endorsed? Leadership Quarterly 102:219–56.	
Dittmar, A., and R. Duchin. 2016. Looking in the rear view mirror: The effect of managers’ professional 
experience on corporate financial policy. Review of Financial Studies 29:565–602. 
Du, Q., F. Yu, and X. Yu. Forthcoming. Cultural proximity and the processing of financial information. 
Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis.  
Ellul, A., and V. Yerramilli. 2013. Strong risk controls, lower risk: Evidence from US bank holding 
companies. Journal of Finance 68:1757–803. 
Fernández, R., and A. Fogli. 2009. Culture: An empirical investigation of beliefs, work, and fertility. 
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1:146–77. 
Giavazzi, F., I. Petkov, and F. Schiantarelli. 2015. Culture: Persistence and evolution. Working Paper. 
Giuliano, P. 2007. Living arrangements in Western Europe: Does cultural origin matter? Journal of the 
European Economic Association 5:927–52. 
36 
Glazer, N., and D. P. Moynihan. 1963. Beyond the melting pot: the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, 
Italians, and Irish of New York City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gneezy, U., K. L. Leonard, and J. A. List. 2009. Gender difference in competition: Evidence from a 
matrilineal and a patriarchal Society. Econometrica 77:1637–64. 
Gruber, J., and D.M. Hungerman. 2008. The church versus the mall: What happens when religion faces 
increased secular competition? Quarterly Journal of Economics 123:831–62. 
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales. 2006. Does culture affect economic outcomes? Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 20:23–48. 
Heckman, J. J. 1979. Dummy endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation system. Econometrica 
46:931–59. 
Hofstede, G., G. J. Hofstede, and M. Minkov. 2010. Cultures and organizations: software of the mind, 
3rd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Hutton, I., D. Jiang, and A. Kumar. 2015. Political Values, Culture, and Corporate Litigation. 
Management Science 61:2905–25. 
Johnson, C., and T. Rice. 2008. Assessing a decade of interstate bank branching. The Washington and Lee 
Law Review 65:73–127. 
Judge, T. A., J. E. Bono, R. Ilies, and M. W. Gerhardt. 2002. Personality and leadership: a qualitative and 
quantitative review. Journal of Applied Psychology 87:765–80. 
Kalmijn, M. 1999. Father involvement in childrearing and the perceived stability of marriage. Journal of 
Marriage and Family 61:409–21. 
Kaplan, S. N., M. M. Klebanov, and M. Sorensen. 2012. Which CEO characteristics and abilities matter? 
Journal of Finance 67:973–1007. 
Kaplan, S. N., and M. Sorensen. 2016. Are CEOs different? Characteristics of top managers. Working 
Paper, University of Chicago. 
Karolyi, G. A. 2016. The gravity of culture for finance. Journal of Corporate Finance 41:610–25. 
Marginson, D., and L. McAulay. 2008. Exploring the debate on short-termism: a theoretical and empirical 
analysis. Strategic Management Journal 29: 273–292. 
Opler, T.C., and S.D. Titman. 1994. Financial distress and corporate performance. Journal of Finance 
49:1015–40. 
Pan, Y., S. Siegel, and T. Y. Wang. Forthcoming. Corporate risk culture. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis. 
Pagnini, D. L., and S. P Morgan. 1990. Intermarriage and social distance among US immigrants at the 
turn of the century. American Journal of Sociology 96:405–32. 
Petersen, M. A. 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. 
Review of Financial Studies 22:435–80. 
Porter, M. E. 1992. Capital disadvantage: America’s failing capital investment system. Harvard Business 
Review 70:65–82. 
Portes, A., and R. G. Rumbaut. 2001. The second generation and the children of immigrants longitudinal 
study. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation. 
Rice, T., and P. Strahan. 2010. Does credit competition affect small firm finance? Journal of Finance 
65:861–89. 
Robalino, N., and A.J. Robson. 2013. Genes, Culture, and Preferences. Biological Theory 8:151–57. 
Schwartz, S. H. 2007. Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations. In 
Measuring attitudes cross-nationally: Lessons from the European social survey, eds. J. Jowell, C. 
Roberts, R. Fitzgerald, and G. Eva. London: Sage Publishers.   
Schoar, A., and L. Zuo. 2017. Shaped by booms and busts: How the economy impacts CEO careers and 
management styles. Review of Financial Studies 30: 1425-2456 
Schoenberg, R., and R. Reeves. 1999. What determines acquisition activity within an industry? European 
Financial Management 17:93–98. 
Yonker, S. Forthcoming. Do managers give hometown labor an edge? Review of Financial Studies.  
37 
Table 1. Summary statistics  
A. CEO’s immigrant generation 
 N Shares of total  
Gen1   5 0.8% 
Gen2-3   293 47.6% 
Gen4+   317 51.6% 
Total  615 100.0% 
 
B. CEO and firm characteristics 
Variables N Mean STD p1 p50 p99 
              
Dependent variables: Bank performance and policies     
ROA (%) 3,060 1.110 0.681 -0.109 1.096 2.465 
ROE (%) 3,060 12.460 6.056 -1.555 12.850 25.520 
Tobin’s q  2,364 1.004 0.004 1.000 1.003 1.016 
Marginal expected shortfall (%) 3,013 -0.011 0.011 -0.042 -0.010 0.011 
Expenses/Income 3,060 0.758 0.085 0.562 0.758 0.987 
       
Competitive measures       
Competitive state 3,060 0.561 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
#liberalizations   3,020 1.846 1.529 0.000 2.000 4.000 
       
CEO cultural measures       
Harmony 3,038 0.399 0.021 0.377 0.386 0.460 
Restraint  3,043 0.416 0.163 0.310 0.320 0.800 
Uncertainty avoidance  3,047 0.539 0.171 0.290 0.460 0.950 
Long-term orientation  3,047 0.403 0.222 0.240 0.260 0.830 
Importance of income equality 2,810 0.444 0.056 0.322 0.428 0.560 
Power distance  3,047 0.429 0.150 0.130 0.400 0.930 
Importance of self-respect 2,810 0.775 0.045 0.676 0.790 0.860 
Masculinity 3,047 0.598 0.125 0.100 0.620 0.790 
Humane orientation  3,015 0.553 0.008 0.532 0.551 0.580 
Trust in others 2,810 0.135 0.007 0.119 0.136 0.159 
Individualism 3,047 0.801 0.158 0.370 0.910 0.910 
Importance of selflessness 2,810 0.335 0.119 0.069 0.391 0.547 
Importance of freedom 2,810 0.745 0.058 0.585 0.754 0.798 
Performance orientation 3,015 0.427 0.029 0.350 0.445 0.447 
Patriotism  2,810 0.352 0.029 0.286 0.368 0.377 
Intellectual autonomy 3,038 0.430 0.013 0.386 0.430 0.453 
       
CEO-specific measures        
Ln (CEO age) 3,060 4.035 0.137 3.689 4.043 4.357 
Ln (CEO tenure) 3,060 1.916 0.802 0.000 2.001 3.466 
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B. CEO and firm characteristics (cont.) 
Variables N Mean STD p1 p50 p99 
Depression baby 3,060 0.036 0.185 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Ivy League 2,809 0.158 0.365 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MBA 2,809 0.246 0.431 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Experienced executives 2,809 0.208 0.406 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Ln (bonus comp)  831 7.165 1.005 5.740 7.048 9.473 
CEO vega/delta 785 0.301 0.252 0.000 0.253 0.993 
CEO ownership 801 0.020 0.055 0.000 0.003 0.333 
       
Bank-specific measures        
Ln (assets) 3,060 14.690 1.801 12.080 14.260 19.870 
Leverage 3,060 0.910 0.040 0.820 0.914 0.953 
Lending 3,060 0.641 0.134 0.103 0.663 0.869 
Deposit 3,060 0.746 0.119 0.280 0.766 0.909 
Stock volatility  3,060 0.020 0.009 0.008 0.019 0.048 
HHI 3,060 0.380 0.198 0.109 0.326 1.000 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for various CEOs and bank variables. Panel A classifies CEOs as Gen1, 
(foreign-born CEOs), Gen2-3, (children or grandchildren of immigrants to the United States), and Gen4+ (fourth (or 
higher) generation immigrants). Panel B reports the summary statistics for other CEO and bank variables. Our 
sample covers all public U.S. banks for the period of 1994–2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the 
definitions for all variables.  
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Table 2. Univariate DiD test: Diagnostics and results  
 
 Treatment Control Treatment minus control 
 Mean Mean Difference p-value 
A. Characteristics of treatment and control banks 
ROA (%) 1.150 1.003 0.148 .280 
Gen2-3  0.340 0.424 -0.084 .284 
Ln (assets) 15.014 14.615 0.399 .207 
Leverage 0.909 0.913 -0.005 .593 
Lending  0.621 0.629 -0.008 .679 
Deposit  0.753 0.800 -0.047 .180 
Stock volatility  0.021 0.022 -0.001 .584 
HHI  0.329 0.457 -0.128 .101 
Ln (CEO age) 4.038 4.027 0.011 .592 
Ln (CEO tenure) 1.869 1.768 0.101 .445 
     
B. Trends in performance and risk  
ΔROA1-year (%) 0.079 -0.026 0.105 .510 
ΔROA2-year (%) -0.009 0.388 -0.397 .383 
ΔLeverage1-year (%) 0.000 0.001 -0.001 .535 
ΔLeverage2-year (%) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 .456 
ΔStock volatility1-year (%) -0.071 -0.040 -0.031 .426 
ΔStock volatility2-year (%) -0.110 -0.024 -0.086 .147 
 
This table compares the characteristics of treatment banks (operating in a state that removes barriers to single 
branch acquisitions and/or a state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions) and control banks located in states that 
implement no such changes. Panel A shows the mean differences and the p-values in the key characteristics of 
treatment and control banks in the year before changes in interstate branching. Panel B shows the mean differences 
and their p-values in the growth rates of the key characteristics of treatment and control banks one and two years 
prior to changes in interstate branching. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all variables. 
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Table 3. CEO cultural heritage and performance 
A. Interaction analyses  
 Heckman two-stage  OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.158*** 0.160*** 0.146*** 0.215*** 0.102** 0.155*** 
 (4.326) (4.333) (3.942) (3.917) (2.289) (4.321) 
Gen2-3  -0.114*** -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.059 -0.061 -0.115*** 
 (-3.933) (-3.528) (-3.691) (-0.376) (-1.405) (-4.206) 
Gen1*Competitive state  0.984** 1.351*** 0.854* 1.117*** 0.596* 0.956*** 
 (2.195) (2.676) (1.910) (6.063) (1.765) (5.376) 
Gen1 -0.157 -0.114 -0.114 -0.707** -0.068 -0.129 
 (-1.423) (-1.067) (-1.027) (-2.087) (-0.368) (-0.631) 
Competitive state -30.835*** -32.762*** -28.639*** -3.031 -12.245 -27.489** 
 (-3.065) (-3.112) (-2.750) (-0.239) (-1.046) (-2.274) 
Ln (assets) 0.536*** 0.492*** 0.546*** 0.231 -0.073 0.535*** 
 (4.722) (4.193) (4.660) (0.825) (-0.410) (4.274) 
Ln (assets)2 -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015* -0.003 -0.015*** 
 (-4.081) (-3.469) (-4.018) (-1.887) (-0.511) (-3.928) 
Leverage -10.399*** -10.456*** -10.503*** -4.740*** -5.943*** -10.998*** 
 (-32.184) (-31.924) (-32.353) (-9.971) (-11.412) (-11.910) 
Lending 0.110 0.128 0.118 -0.293** -0.028 0.135 
 (0.896) (0.978) (0.918) (-2.298) (-0.180) (1.010) 
Deposit -0.304** -0.185 -0.250* 0.214 -0.615*** -0.311* 
 (-2.125) (-1.221) (-1.671) (1.469) (-3.012) (-1.782) 
Stock volatility  -5.959*** -2.457 -3.556** -3.495*** -8.717*** -6.503*** 
 (-3.986) (-1.469) (-2.368) (-3.109) (-6.018) (-2.581) 
HHI -0.164* 0.210 -0.159 -0.442 -0.054 -0.157* 
 (-1.760) (0.247) (-1.330) (-1.138) (-0.648) (-1.778) 
Ln (CEO age) -11.372** -13.390*** -11.410** 2.266 8.461 -5.648 
 (-2.439) (-2.752) (-2.354) (0.262) (1.422) (-1.167) 
Ln (CEO age)2 1.415** 1.661*** 1.418** -0.227 -1.053 0.697 
 (2.428) (2.732) (2.341) (-0.210) (-1.415) (1.156) 
Ln (CEO tenure)  0.137** 0.128** 0.156*** -0.098** 0.007 0.109* 
 (2.419) (2.102) (2.690) (-2.392) (0.122) (1.919) 
Ln (CEO tenure)2  -0.024 -0.022 -0.030* 0.032** 0.010 -0.020 
 (-1.477) (-1.280) (-1.810) (1.989) (0.573) (-1.318) 
Lambda  0.192** 0.302*** 0.247*** -0.089 -0.334** - 
 (2.110) (3.314) (2.683) (-0.313) (-2.287) - 
Year FE Yes No No No No Yes 
State FE Yes No No No No Yes 
State-year trends FE No No Yes No No No 
State-year FE No Yes No No No No 
County-year FE No No No Yes No No 
Firm FE No No No No Yes No 
Observations 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 3,059 
B. H0 = Gen2-3 CEOs*Competitive state + Gen2-3 CEOs = 0  
F-test 3.58* 2.57* 6.22** 7.82** 0.94 2.88* 
The dependent variable is ROA. Gen2-3 is a dummy that equals one if the CEO is the child or grandchild of 
immigrants to the United States. Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if a given state at any given time 
removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or a state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Columns (1) 
to (5) present OLS results controlling for self-selection bias by including the inverse Mills ratio from a first-stage 
probit regression. Column (6) replicates the model in Column (1) after excluding the inverse Mills ratio. Standard 
errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Table A2 (see the 
appendix) provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
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Table 4. Generation of immigrant effects 
 
A. Interaction analysis   
Dependent variable: ROA   
 Gen1 Gen2 Gen3 Gen4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
Gen1*Competitive state 1.218**    
 (2.395)    
Gen1 -0.062    
 (-0.592)    
Gen2*Competitive state  0.153***   
  (3.015)   
Gen2  -0.076**   
  (-2.170)   
Gen3*Competitive state   0.113***  
   (2.704)  
Gen3   -0.032  
   (-0.965)  
Gen4*Competitive state    -0.116 
    (-1.445) 
Gen4    0.099 
    (1.366) 
Competitive state -35.699*** -28.375*** -24.285** -27.006** 
 (-3.436) (-2.872) (-2.469) (-2.498) 
Lambda  0.379*** 0.109* 0.148** 0.135** 
 (4.254) (1.688) (2.246) (2.021) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,569 2,569 2,569 2,569 
B. H0 = Generation of immigrant CEOs*Competitive state + Generation of immigrant CEOs = 0 
F-test 5.40** 4.39** 9.95*** 0.24 
 
The dependent variable is ROA. Gen1 indicates CEOs who are born outside the United States. Gen2/Gen3/Gen4 
indicates CEOs who are second-, third-, and fourth-generation immigrants. Competitive state is a dummy that 
equals one if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or a state-wide 
deposit cap on branch acquisitions. All models include state-year fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered 
by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions 
for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.
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Table 5. The cultural heritage of non-CEO top executives and performance  
 
Dependent variable: ROA     
 
Second 
executive 
CFO Top team Second 
executive 
CFO Top team 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Gen2-3 second executive *Competitive 
state -0.001  
 
-0.046  
 
 (-0.008)   (-0.862)   
Gen2-3 second executive -0.004   0.014   
 (-0.029)   (0.320)   
Gen2-3 CFO*Competitive state  (-0.100)   -0.050  
  -0.041   (-0.566)  
Gen2-3 CFO  (-0.058)   -0.053  
     (-0.649)  
Gen2-3 Top team*Competitive state   -0.099   -0.158 
   (-1.083)   (-1.435) 
Gen2-3 Top team   0.120   0.105 
   (1.634)   (1.121) 
Gen2-3 CEO*Competitive state    0.118** 0.293*** 0.107** 
    (2.010) (3.023) (2.516) 
Gen2-3 CEO    -0.048 -0.332*** -0.054 
    (-0.943) (-3.639) (-1.595) 
Competitive state -38.113 288.096 -70.932*** -19.293 40.990 -45.172** 
 (-0.675) (0.576) (-4.967) (-0.967) (1.462) (-2.389) 
Lambda  -2.090 6.820 -0.084 0.635 -0.111 0.018 
 (-0.711) (0.857) (-0.377) (0.803) (-0.343) (0.588) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,159 854 2,615 1,619 701 1,991 
 
This table tests for the cultural heritage effects of non-CEO top executives. We examine three groups of non-CEO top 
executives: (1) the second-highest paid executive, (2) the CFO, and (3) the team of the five highest-paid executives (less the 
CEO). Columns (1)-(3) only control for the cultural heritage of non-CEOs, while Columns (4)-(6) control for the cultural 
heritage of CEOs and non-CEOs. The dependent variable is ROA. Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if a given 
state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. 
Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) 
provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Individual cultural values and performance  
 
  β1  β2  β3 
 Cultural dimension Obs. coefficient  (t-stat)  coefficient  (t-stat)  coefficient  (t-stat) 
1 Harmony 3,049 2.813 *** (3.335)  -2.383 *** (-3.605)  -33.689 *** (-3.213) 
2 Restraint  3,035 0.373 *** (3.450)  -0.241 *** (-2.800)  -33.167 *** (-3.089) 
3 Uncertainty avoidance  3,039 0.357 *** (3.470)  -0.225 *** (-2.855)  -34.592 *** (-3.231) 
4 Long-term orientation  3,039 0.236 *** (2.958)  -0.186 *** (-2.929)  -31.283 *** (-2.921) 
5 Importance of income equality 2,803 0.486 (1.496)  -0.370  (-1.419)  -27.221 ** (-2.486) 
6 Power Distance    3,040 0.242 (1.317)  -0.067  (-0.471)  -32.138 * (-1.719) 
7 Importance of self-respect 2,803 -0.299 (-0.704)  0.177  (0.512)  -27.824 ** (-2.568) 
8 Masculinity 3,040 -0.230 (-1.598)  0.039  (0.346)  -34.755 *** (-3.211) 
9 Humane-orientation  3,007 -0.628 (-0.305)  -0.424  (-0.282)  -29.649 *** (-2.805) 
10 Trust in others 2,803 -1.731 (-0.627)  0.275  (0.139)  -27.895 *** (-2.586) 
11 Individualism 3,039 -0.508 *** (-4.487)  0.226 ** (2.556)  -38.051 *** (-3.539) 
12 Importance of selflessness 2,803 -0.670 *** (-4.542)  0.366 *** (3.058)  -28.419 *** (-2.641) 
13 Importance of freedom 2,803 -1.352 *** (-3.949)  1.014 *** (3.533)  -24.400 ** (-2.284) 
14 Performance orientation 3,007 -2.022 *** (-3.198)  1.513 *** (2.951)  -30.066 *** (-2.848) 
15 Patriotism  2,803 -2.093 *** (-3.446)  1.487 *** (3.150)  -24.496 ** (-2.273) 
16 Intellectual autonomy 3,049 -3.556 *** (-2.766)  1.062  (1.077)  -31.568 *** (-2.964) 
 
This table reports the estimation results of the following regression specification: 
ROAitk = α + β1Cultural dimensionit*Competitive statetk + β2Cultural dimensionit + β3Competitive statetk + Controls + State-year FE + εitk. 
The dependent variable is ROA. Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions 
and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. A total of 16 cultural dimensions are obtained from Hofstede, Schwartz, GLOBE, and WVS. We assign 
the values of each cultural dimension to CEOs according to their ancestral background. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all all cultural 
dimensions and variables. We sequentially display the coefficient estimates for regressions on each cultural dimension. For brevity, the table reports the 
coefficients on the interaction term between the cultural dimensions and competitive state (β1) and the coefficients on its constituent variables (β2 and β3). All 
models include state-year fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Factor analysis 
A. Factor loadings for individual cultural dimensions    
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Eigenvalue  7.023 2.204 1.501 
% explained 0.540 0.170 0.085 
Cumulative % explained 0.540 0.710 0.795 
    
Harmony -0.308 0.140 0.102 
Restraint  -0.340 -0.065 0.008 
Uncertainty avoidance  -0.325 -0.228 -0.008 
Long-term orientation  -0.328 0.189 0.083 
Importance of income equality -0.052 0.485 0.264 
Power distance  -0.233 -0.370 -0.222 
Importance of self-respect 0.210 0.068 -0.154 
Masculinity 0.059 -0.197 0.569 
Humane orientation  -0.066 0.409 -0.290 
Trust in others 0.187 0.408 -0.258 
Individualism 0.329 0.032 0.154 
Importance of selflessness 0.221 -0.231 -0.057 
Importance of freedom 0.300 -0.059 -0.124 
Performance orientation 0.313 0.080 0.137 
Patriotism  0.282 -0.269 -0.149 
Intellectual autonomy 0.089 0.052 0.532 
    
B. Competitive pressures, factor scores, and performance  
Dependent variable: ROA   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Factor 1*Competitive state -0.025***   -0.026*** 
 (-3.793)   (-3.898) 
Factor 1 0.014***   0.014*** 
 (2.643)   (2.616) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  0.015  0.016 
  (1.390)  (1.497) 
Factor 2  -0.014  -0.013 
  (-1.642)  (-1.572) 
Factor 3*Competitive state   -0.011 -0.014 
   (-0.904) (-1.157) 
Factor 3   -0.008 -0.007 
   (-0.848) (-0.796) 
Competitive state -29.900*** -25.678** -29.421*** -31.287*** 
 (-2.765) (-2.361) (-2.706) (-2.848) 
Lambda  0.301*** 0.319*** 0.322*** 0.319*** 
 (3.262) (3.448) (3.491) (3.429) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,799 2,799 2,799 2,799 
Panel A presents factor loadings on three factors with eigenvalue >1 based on 16 cultural dimensions. Factor 
loadings greater than |0.3| are shown in bold. Panel B links each CEO’s factor scores to bank performance under 
competitive pressure. The dependent variable is ROA. Factor 1, factor 2, and factor 3 are the predicted scores 
obtained from factor analysis. Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if a given state at any given time 
removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Standard errors 
are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) 
provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Factor regressions on bank policies 
 
A. Acquisition propensity 
Dependent variable: # acquisitions announced in a given year   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Factor 1*Competitive state 0.008**   0.008* 
 (1.978)   (1.711) 
Factor 1 -0.006*   -0.006 
 (-1.816)   (-1.606) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  0.006  0.007 
  (1.162)  (1.169) 
Factor 2  -0.016**  -0.016** 
  (-2.213)  (-2.024) 
Factor 3*Competitive state   -0.005 -0.003 
   (-0.636) (-0.321) 
Factor 3   -0.001 0.001 
   (-0.109) (0.112) 
Competitive state -0.358 -3.875 -1.287 -3.207 
 (-0.058) (-0.574) (-0.210) (-0.434) 
Lambda -0.150 -0.252 -0.028 -0.275 
 (-0.513) (-0.827) (-0.102) (-0.714) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,609 2,609 2,609 2,609 
B. Acquisition performance  
Dependent variable: CARs [-2, +2] %   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Factor 1*Competitive state -0.004**   -0.004** 
 (-1.973)   (-1.976) 
Factor 1 0.003*   0.003 
 (1.697)   (1.578) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.413)  (-0.439) 
Factor 2  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-0.652)  (-0.501) 
Factor 3*Competitive state   -0.006* -0.005 
   (-1.710) (-1.462) 
Factor 3   0.001 0.001 
   (0.705) (0.278) 
Competitive state -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 
 (-1.623) (-1.330) (-1.169) (-1.331) 
Deal-specific controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Observations 239 239 239 239 
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C. Bank risk-taking     
Dependent variable: Stock return volatility   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Factor 1*Competitive state 0.036**   0.037** 
 (2.079)   (2.111) 
Factor 1 -0.014   -0.014 
 (-1.000)   (-1.018) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  0.019  0.021 
  (0.877)  (0.959) 
Factor 2  -0.015  -0.016 
  (-0.810)  (-0.868) 
Factor 3*Competitive state  45.858 -0.004 -0.003 
  (1.356) (-0.149) (-0.107) 
Factor 3   0.013 0.014 
   (0.542) (0.609) 
Competitive state 50.105 45.858 45.359 54.279 
 (1.501) (1.356) (1.360) (1.639) 
Lambda  0.006   0.006  0.006   0.007 
 (0.016)     (0.016)     (0.016)     (0.016)     
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,756 2,756 2,756 2,756 
D. Cost efficiency   
Dependent variable: Expense/Income   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Factor 1*Competitive state 0.006***   0.006*** 
 (3.369)   (3.569) 
Factor 1 -0.001   -0.001 
 (-0.686)   (-0.682) 
Factor 2*Competitive state  0.004  0.004 
  (1.286)  (1.426) 
Factor 2  0.001  0.001 
  (0.291)  (0.285) 
Factor 3*Competitive state   0.003 0.003 
   (0.985) (1.026) 
Factor 3   -0.000 -0.000 
   (-0.055) (-0.061) 
Competitive state 3.617 2.491 2.252 4.553 
 (0.940) (0.653) (0.590) (1.160) 
Lambda  0.106*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (2.999) (2.933) (2.964) (2.982) 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,799 2,799 2,799 2,799 
This table links a CEO’s cultural factor scores to bank’s policy choices under competitive pressure. The dependent 
variables are acquisition propensity (panel A), five-day [2, +2] merger announcement returns (panel B), annual stock 
return volatility (panel C), and total expense scaled by total income (panel D). Factors 1, 2, and 3 are estimated 
using factor analysis (in Table 7). Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if a given state at any given time 
removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Standard errors 
are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) 
provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix  
Table A1. The deregulation of interstate banking 
 
State Effective date Single branch 
acquisition 
restriction 
State-wide 
deposit cap on 
branch 
acquisition 
Age 
restriction 
De novo 
interstate 
branching 
restriction 
Alabama  May 31, 1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Alaska Jan 1, 1994 No 50% 3 Yes 
Arizona Aug 31, 2001 No 30% 5 Yes 
Arizona Sep 1, 1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Arkansas  Jun 1, 1997 Yes 25% 5 Yes 
California Sep 28, 1995 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Colorado  Jun 1, 1997 Yes 25% 5 Yes 
Connecticut  Jun 27, 1995 No 30% 5 No 
Delaware  Sep 29, 1995 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Washington DC  Jun 13, 1996 No 30% No No 
Florida  Jun 1, 1997 Yes 30% 3 Yes 
Georgia May 10, 1997 Yes 30% 3 Yes 
Georgia Jun 1, 1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Hawaii Jan 1, 2001 No 30% No No 
Hawaii Jun 1, 1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Idaho Sep 29, 1995 Yes No 5 Yes 
Illinois  Aug 20, 2004 No 30% No No 
Illinois  Jun 1, 1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Indiana  Jul 1, 1998 No 30% 5 No 
Indiana  Jun 1, 1997 No 30% No No 
Iowa Apr 4, 1996 Yes 15% 5 Yes 
Kansas Sep 29, 1995 Yes 15% 5 Yes 
Kentucky  Mar 22, 2004 Yes 15% No Yes 
Kentucky  Mar 17, 2000 Yes 15% No Yes 
Kentucky  Jun 1, 1997 Yes 15% 5 Yes 
Louisiana  Jun 1, 1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Maine Jan 1, 1997 No 30% No No 
Maryland  Sep 29, 1995 No 30% No No 
Massachusetts Aug 2, 1996 No 30% 3 No 
Michigan Nov 29, 1995 No No No No 
Minnesota Jun 1, 1997 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Mississippi Jun 1, 1997 Yes 25% 5 Yes 
Missouri Sep 29, 1995 Yes 13% 5 Yes 
Montana Oct 1, 2001 Yes 22% 5 Yes 
Montana Sep 29, 1995 N/A +1% per year 
from 18% to 
22% 
4 N/A 
Nebraska May 31, 1997 Yes 14% 5 Yes 
Nevada Sep 29, 1995 Limited 30% 5 Limited 
New Hampshire  Jan 1, 2002 No 30% No No 
New Hampshire  Aug 1, 2000 No 30% 5 No 
New Hampshire  Jun 1, 1997 Yes 20% 5 Yes 
New Jersey Apr 17, 1996 No 30% No Yes 
New Mexico Jun 1, 1996 Yes 40% 5 Yes 
New York  Jun 1, 1997 No 30% 5 Yes 
North Carolina  Jul 1, 1995 No 30% No No 
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North Dakota Aug 1, 2003 No 25% No No 
North Dakota May 31, 1997 Yes 25% No Yes 
Ohio May 21,1997 No 30% No No 
Oklahoma May 17, 2000 No 20% No No 
Oklahoma May 31, 1997 Yes 15% 5 Yes 
Oregon Jul 1, 1997 Yes 30% 3 Yes 
Pennsylvania Jul 6, 1995 No 30% No No 
Rhode Island  Jun 20, 1995 No 30% No No 
South Carolina  Jul 1, 1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
South Dakota Mar 9, 1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Tennessee Mar 17, 2003 No 30% 3 No 
Tennessee Jul 1, 2001 No 30% 5 No 
Tennessee May 1, 1998 No 30% 5 Yes 
Tennessee Jun 1, 1997 Yes 20% 5 Yes 
Texas Sep 1, 1999 No 20% No No 
Texas Aug 28, 1995 N/A 20% N/A N/A 
Utah  Apr 30, 2001 No 30% 5 No 
Utah  Jun 1, 1995 No 30% 5 Yes 
Vermont  Jan 1, 2001 No 30% No No 
Vermont  May 30, 1996 No 30% 5 Yes 
Virginia Sep 29, 1995 No 30% No No 
Washington  May 9, 2005 No 30% 5 No 
Washington  Jun 6, 1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
West Virginia  May 31, 1997 No 25% No No 
Wisconsin May 1, 1996 Yes 30% 5 Yes 
Wyoming  May 31, 1997 Yes 30% 3 Yes 
 
The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) grants U.S. states the option to (1) impose a 
minimum age of three years on target institutions of interstate acquirers; (2) not to permit de novo interstate 
branching; (3) not to permit the acquisition of individual branches by an out-of-state bank; and (4) impose a deposit 
cap of 30% or lower, that is, block out-of-state banks from acquiring an in-state bank that holds more than 30% of 
the deposits in that state. This table shows the regulatory changes to instate branching over the period 1994–2006. 
Each column refers to one roadblock that a state adopts against the IBBEA provisions. N/A means not applicable 
where states block competition completely. Source: Rice and Strahan (2010).  
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Table A2. Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition Source 
CEO’s cultural heritage measures   
Gen2-3 Equals one if the CEO is a child or grandchild of immigrants  ancestry.com 
Gen4+ Equals one if the CEO is a fourth or higher generation of 
immigrants 
ancestry.com 
Gen1 Equals one if the CEO is a foreign immigrant ancestry.com 
Gen2 Equals one if the CEO is a child of foreign immigrants ancestry.com 
Gen3 Equals one if the CEO is a grandchild of foreign immigrants ancestry.com 
Gen4 Equals one if the CEO is a great-grandchild of foreign immigrants ancestry.com 
Harmony Related to the freedom to pursue own thoughts   Schwartz 
Restraint  Related to the ability to control desires    Hofstede 
Uncertainty avoidance  Related to the level of stress in the face of an unknown future  Hofstede 
Long-term orientation  Related to the choice of focus for people effort   Hofstede 
Importance of income equality Related to the importance of income equality    WVS 
Power distance Related to the basic problem of human inequality Hofstede  
Importance of self-respect Related to the importance of self-respect   WVS 
Masculinity  Related to the division of emotional between gender   Hofstede 
Humane orientation  Related to the extent to which altruism and generosity is rewarded   GLOBE 
Trust in others Related to the willingness to trust in others   WVS 
Individualism  Related to the integration of individuals into group  Hofstede 
Importance of selflessness Related to the importance of selflessness    WVS 
Importance of freedom Related to the importance of freedom   WVS 
Performance orientation Related to the extent to which performance is rewarded   GLOBE 
Patriotism Related to the importance of patriotism WVS 
Intellectual autonomy Related to the discomfort with confrontation and assertiveness  Schwartz  
  
Bank competition measures   
Competitive state  Dummy equals one if a given state at any given time removes 
barriers to single branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap 
on branch acquisition 
#liberalizations Number ranges from zero (highly regulated) to four (deregulated) 
based on regulation changes in a given state 
Before
2+
 All years up to and including two years before the deregulation  
Before
1
 One year prior to deregulation 
Present The year of deregulation 
After
1
 One year post-deregulation 
After
2+
 Two years after the deregulation 
Rice and 
Strahan 2010 
   
Bank outcomes 
ROA (%) Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by book value of 
total assets (BHCK2170) 
CRSP, 
FR Y9-C 
ROE (%) EBIT divided by book value of total equity (BHCK3210) CRSP, 
FR Y9-C 
Tobin’s q Market value of equity divided by book value of total equity 
(BHCK3210) 
CRSP 
Stock volatility Standard deviation of a firm’s stock return in a given year CRSP 
Expense/Income Total expenses (BHCK4073+ BHCK4093) divided by total income 
(BHCK 4107+BHCK4079) 
FR Y9-C 
Marginal expected shortfall The average return for each bank on days when the returns of the 
overall financial markets are in bottom 5% in a given year 
CRSP 
 
Other CEO characteristics  
Ln (CEO age) Natural logarithm of the CEO age BoardEx 
Ln (CEO tenure) Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has served in BoardEx 
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this position 
Ivy League Equals one if the CEO has an Ivy League education  BoardEx 
MBA Equals one if the CEO has an MBA degree  BoardEx 
Experienced executives Equals one if the CEO with previous executive appointments   BoardEx 
Depression baby Equals one if the CEO was born between 1920 and 1929 BoardEx 
Ln (bonus comp)  Natural logarithm of the CEO bonus compensation ExecuComp 
CEO ownership The fraction of shares owned by the CEO  ExecuComp 
CEO vega Sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return volatility, 
expressed in $‘1000 
ExecuComp 
CEO delta Sensitivity of CEO compensation to share price, expressed in 
$‘1000 
ExecuComp 
   
Other bank characteristics  
Ln (assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (BHCK2170) FR Y-9C 
Leverage Book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets FR Y-9C 
Lending Ratio of total loans (BHCK2122) divided by total assets FR Y-9C 
Deposits Ratio of total deposits (BHDM6631+BHFN6631 + BHDM6636 + 
BHFN6636) divided by total assets 
FR Y-9C 
HHI Index measuring the concentration of deposits at the state level FR Y-9C 
Foreign loans Total foreign loans divided by total assets  FR Y-9C 
Foreign deposits  Total foreign deposits divided by total assets  FR Y-9C 
   
County-level characteristics   
Ln (population) Natural logarithm of the county population  U.S. Census 
Bureau 
Civilian labor force Fraction of the population who have jobs or are seeking jobs, are at 
least 16 years old, are not serving in the military and are not 
institutionalized 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
Ln (personal income) Natural logarithm of the individual’s income from wages, 
investment enterprises and other ventures 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
Religiosity  The number of religious adherents divided by the total population. 
Data are available for 1990, 2000, and 2010 and are interpolated for 
the remaining years  
Association of 
Religion Data 
Archive 
 
Characteristics at origin in 1900 
Ln (GDP) at origin  Natural logarithm of GDP in the ancestral country of origin of the 
CEO 
UN Statistics 
Division 
Ln (life expectancy) at origin Natural logarithm of life expectancy in the ancestral country of 
origin of the CEO 
UN Statistics 
Division 
Legal system at origin Equals one if the CEO ancestral country of origin has a French 
Civil with German Civil law influence, two if German Civil law, 
three if Common law, four if Nordic law, and five if mixed between 
Napoleonic law and German law  
UN Statistics 
Division 
   
Corporate governance measures   
Board size The number of directors sitting on the board BoardEx 
Board independence The fraction of nonexecutive directors on the board BoardEx 
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Table A3. Probit estimates on available data about a CEO’s ancestors (first-stage Heckman results)  
 
Dependent variable: Equals one if data on the CEO’s ancestor is available  
  (1) (2) 
      
Ln (assets) 0.116*** 0.113*** 
 (3.014) (2.605) 
Ln (assets)
2 
-0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.559) (-1.241) 
Competitive state  -0.049** 0.486*** 
 (-2.042) (14.656) 
Leverage 0.041 0.067 
 (0.283) (0.482) 
Lending -0.102** -0.070 
 (-2.233) (-1.372) 
Deposit 0.318*** 0.332*** 
 (4.899) (4.581) 
HHI 0.059 1.349*** 
 (1.416) (53.368) 
Stock volatility  0.389 0.534 
 (0.632) (0.699) 
Ln (CEO age) -12.994*** -12.866*** 
 (-8.257) (-7.277) 
Ln (CEO age)
2 
1.635*** 1.619*** 
 (8.402) (7.406) 
Ln (CEO tenure)  0.079*** 0.111*** 
 (3.150) (3.816) 
Ln (CEO tenure)
2
  -0.010 -0.016** 
 (-1.353) (-2.022) 
CEO’s surname length  0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (9.220) (8.039) 
Year FE Yes No 
State FE Yes No 
State-year FE No Yes 
Observations 5,649 5,649 
 
This table estimates the likelihood that we are able to identify a CEO’s country of origin from ancestry.com. This 
analysis is estimated over a full sample of 5,636 bank-year observations from 1996 to 2004. The dependent variable 
equals one when we can retrieve data on the CEO’s ancestor. Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if a 
given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch 
acquisition. CEO’s surname length is the length of a CEO’s surname. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm 
and year. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all variables.  t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A4. Does endogenous CEO-firm matching drive our results?  
 
A. Are our results driven by CEOs appointed closer to deregulation?  
 Tenure before deregulation >= 3 Tenure before deregulation < 3 
  (1) (2) 
      
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.264*** 0.204*** 
 (5.155) (3.758) 
Gen2-3 -0.158*** -0.122*** 
 (-4.153) (-2.658) 
Competitive state 16.890 -30.593* 
 (1.029) (-1.731) 
Lambda  -0.059 0.452*** 
 (-0.595) (4.319) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,503 1,503 
B. Exogenous CEO turnovers   
 ROA ΔROA 
  (1) (2) 
      
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.282** 1.093*** 
 (2.426) (2.668) 
Gen2-3 -0.224** -1.271*** 
 (-2.207) (-3.582) 
Competitive state -11.414 -47.839 
 (-0.376) (-0.428) 
Lambda  -0.231 -1.275 
 (-1.008) (-1.554) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 523 520 
 
This table reports various tests to address concerns about endogenous CEO-firm matching. Panel A tests whether 
our results are driven by CEOs who have been appointed closer to deregulation. Column (1) includes firm-year 
observations in which the CEO assumes office at least three years before a state opens for deregulation. Column (2) 
includes firm-year observations in which the CEO assumes office within three years of deregulation. Panel B 
evaluates bank performance around exogenous CEO turnover events (arising from CEO death, illness, or long-
planned retirements). Column (1) reports a bank fixed effects panel regressions on ROA, and Column (2) reports 
difference regressions on performance differences (ΔROA, in percentages). Competitive state is a dummy that 
equals one if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit 
cap on branch acquisitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 
1994–2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A5. Controlling for additional county characteristics  
 
Dependent variable: ROA   
 (1) (2) 
   
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.147*** 0.161*** 
 (3.864) (4.226) 
Gen2-3 -0.093*** -0.105*** 
 (-3.104) (-3.519) 
Ln (population)*Competitive state -0.117 -0.134* 
 (-1.524) (-1.739) 
Ln (population) 0.159** 0.175** 
 (2.089) (2.290) 
Civilian labor force*Competitive state 0.530 0.635 
 (1.092) (1.302) 
Civilian labor force -0.099 -0.137 
 (-0.255) (-0.352) 
Ln (personal income)*Competitive state 0.018 0.025 
 (1.058) (1.439) 
Ln (personal income) -0.029** -0.031** 
 (-2.203) (-2.309) 
Religiosity*Competitive state 1.580 0.510*** 
 (0.973) (2.782) 
Religiosity  -0.309* 
  (-1.916) 
Competitive state 1.580 1.546 
 (0.973) (0.942) 
Lambda 0.313*** 0.346*** 
 (3.410) (3.714) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes 
Observations     2,983 2,946  
 
This table reports estimation results that control for additional county-level controls: Ln (population), the natural 
logarithm of the county population; Civilian labor force, the fraction of the population who have jobs or are 
seeking jobs, are at least 16 years old, are not serving in the military and are not institutionalized; Ln (personal 
income), the natural logarithm of the individual’s income from wages, investment enterprises and other ventures; 
and Religiosity, the number of religious adherents divided by the total population. Data on religiosity are available 
for 1990, 2000, and 2010 and are interpolated for the remaining years. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 
one if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap on 
branch acquisition.  Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–
2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A6. Controlling for additional CEO characteristics  
Dependent variable: ROA 
 (1) (2) 
      
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.126*** 0.135* 
 (3.296) (1.954) 
Gen2-3 -0.107*** -0.072 
 (-3.458) (-1.393) 
Ivy League*Competitive state -0.069  
 (-1.303)  
Ivy League 0.102**  
 (2.487)  
MBA*Competitive state 0.170***  
 (3.833)  
MBA  -0.102***  
 (-2.817)  
Experienced executives*Competitive state -0.054  
 (-1.251)  
Experienced executives -0.117***  
 (-3.598)  
Depression baby*Competitive state -0.027  
 (-0.231)  
Depression baby -0.119  
 (-1.293)  
Ln (bonus comp)*Competitive state  -0.314*** 
  (-5.534) 
Ln (bonus comp)  0.478*** 
  (10.445) 
CEO ownership*Competitive state  -0.808*** 
  (-4.765) 
CEO ownership  0.270** 
  (1.986) 
CEO vega/delta*Competitive state  -0.456 
  (-0.586) 
CEO vega/delta  -0.014 
  (-0.021) 
Competitive state 1.209 -9.798** 
 (0.828) (-2.438) 
Lambda  0.277*** 0.082 
 (3.413) (0.700) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 2,808 784 
This table reports estimation results that control for additional CEO characteristics. Column (1) controls for 
observable CEO characteristics: Ivy League indicates CEOs who graduated from an Ivy League institution; MBA 
indicates CEOs with an MBA degree; Experienced executives indicates CEOs with prior experience as a top 
executive; and Depression baby indicates CEO born between 1920 and 1929. Columns (2) controls for CEO pay 
incentives: ln(bonus comp), the natural logarithm of the CEO bonus compensation; CEO ownership, the fraction of 
shares owned by the CEO; CEO vega/ CEO delta, CEO’s risk-taking incentives relative to pay-performance 
sensitivity. Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if a given state at any given time removes barriers to 
single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisitions. Standard errors are double-
clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. All models include state-year fixed effects. 
Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A7. Economic development and institutional quality in the CEO’s country of origin  
 
Dependent variable: ROA  
 (1) 
    
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.121** 
 (2.444) 
Gen2-3 -0.086** 
 (-2.223) 
Ln (GDP) at origin*Competitive state -0.003 
 (-0.024) 
Ln (GDP) at origin 0.109 
 (1.219) 
Ln (life expectancy) at origin*Competitive state -0.390 
 (-1.410) 
Ln (life expectancy) at origin -0.122 
 (-0.567) 
Legal system at origin*Competitive state 0.045* 
 (1.802) 
Legal system at origin -0.008 
 (-0.431) 
Competitive state 1.310 
 (0.816) 
Lambda  0.160* 
 (1.739) 
Gen1 controls Yes 
Other controls  Yes 
State-year FE Yes 
Observations 2,888 
 
This table reports estimation results that control for the economic development and quality of institutions of the 
CEO’s ancestral country of origin, measured in 1900 terms. Ln (GDP) at origin is the natural logarithm of GDP in 
the ancestral country of origin of the CEO; Ln (life expectancy) at origin is the natural logarithm of life expectancy 
in the ancestral country of origin of the CEO; Legal system at origin is equals one if the CEO ancestral country of 
origin has a French Civil with German Civil law influence, two if German Civil law, three if Common law, four if 
Nordic law, and five if mixed between Napoleonic law and German law. Competitive state is a dummy that equals 
one if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisitions and/or state-wide deposit cap 
on branch acquisitions. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 1994–
2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A8. The dynamics of bank profitability during deregulation  
A. Dynamics of bank profitability 
Dependent variable: ROA 
  (1) (2) 
Before
2+
*Gen2-3 0.031 0.062 
 (0.455) (0.857) 
Before
1
*Gen2-3
 
-0.001 0.084 
 (-0.009) (0.809) 
Present*Gen2-3 0.135 0.173* 
 (1.502) (1.780) 
After
1
*Gen2-3 0.140* 0.127 
 (1.762) (1.527) 
After
2+
*Gen2-3 0.192*** 0.200*** 
 (4.383) (4.667) 
Gen2-3 -0.135*** 0.062 
 (-3.868) (0.857) 
Before
2+
  0.247 -0.137*** 
 (1.006) (-4.011) 
Before
1 
0.304 0.038 
 (1.229) (0.123) 
Present 0.127 0.075 
 (0.471) (0.242) 
After
1
 0.071 0.745 
 (0.265) (0.550) 
After
2+
 -0.017 0.789 
 (-0.063) (0.580) 
Lambda 0.161* 0.275*** 
 (1.754) (3.013) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No 
State FE Yes No 
State-year FE No Yes 
Observations 3065 3065 
B. Placebo checks   
Dependent variable: ROA   
 (1) 
Gen2-3*Competitive state  0.041 
 (1.137) 
Gen2-3 -0.038 
 (-1.573) 
Competitive state 18.349* 
 (1.696) 
Gen1 controls Yes 
Other controls  Yes 
State-year FE Yes 
Observations 3,018 
This table provides additional evidence on the validity of our shock. Panel A tests the dynamics of bank profitability 
during deregulation by replacing the competitive state dummy with a set of dummies around the year in which the 
state removes barriers to interstate branching. Panel B displays a placebo test in which we inaccurately assign states 
into two competitive categories. All models include state-year fixed effects. Competitive state is a dummy that 
equals one if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit 
cap on branch acquisition.  Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year. The sample covers the period 
1994–2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table A9. Alternative regression specifications: Performance, industry competition, and empirical model  
 ROE (%) Tobin’s q MES  CEO birth 
year ≤1940 
CEO birth 
year >1940 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
         
Gen2-3*Competitive state 2.203*** 0.498*** -0.127* 0.280*** 0.200*** 
 (4.712) (4.609) (-1.893) (3.748) (4.372) 
Gen2-3 -1.644*** -0.347*** 0.030 0.172 -0.130*** 
 (-4.461) (-3.883) (0.560) (0.829) (-3.456) 
Competitive state -14.047 -16.363*** 7.830*** -0.363 -2.299 
 (-0.805) (-3.807) (3.155) (-0.102) (-1.284) 
Lambda  1.383 1.114*** 0.576*** -0.152 0.388*** 
 (1.256) (2.788) (3.242) (-0.894) (4.228) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,059 2,363 3,012 828 2,231 
 
 All 
relaxations  
Within-state 
only 
Add board 
controls 
ROA in 
1994 
Add foreign 
controls 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         
Gen2-3*Competitive state 0.041*** 0.180*** 0.213*** 0.164*** 0.148*** 
 (-3.337) (2.627) (4.784) (4.343) (4.296) 
Gen2-3 -0.055** -0.112* -0.132*** -0.063** -0.095*** 
 (1.995) (-1.766) (-3.565) (-2.055) (-3.514) 
Competitive state 0.072 -18.053 0.892 -20.465** 0.016 
 (0.183) (-0.732) (0.533) (-2.098) (0.011) 
Lambda  0.281*** 0.598*** 0.224** 0.047 0.155* 
 (3.078) (3.711) (2.280) (0.591) (1.901) 
Gen1 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,066 2,012 2,409 2,374 3,025 
 
This table reports alternative regression specifications. Columns (1), (2), and (3) use alternative performance 
measures as dependent variables: ROE (%), Tobin’s q, and MES. Columns (4) and (5) test whether our results are 
driven by the data collection process, Column (4) includes observations in which the CEO is born before 1940, 
while Column (5) includes observations in which the CEO is born after 1940. Column (6) uses an alternative 
measure of industry competition: #relaxations, the number of relaxations (as opposed to barriers) the state adopts 
towards interstate branching. Column (7) only considers banks operating in competitive states where banks with 
Gen2-3 CEOs are assigned to the treatment group and those with Gen4+ are assigned to the control group. Column 
(8) includes two additional board characteristics: board size, the total number of directors on the board; and board 
independence, the fraction of nonexecutive directors on the board. Columns (9) controls for ROA in 1994, which is 
the performance of the bank at the beginning of the sample period. Column (10) controls for foreign loans, which is 
total foreign loans divided by total assets; and foreign deposits, which is total foreign deposits divided by total 
assets. Competitive state is a dummy that equals one if a given state at any given time removes barriers to single 
branch acquisition and/or state-wide deposit cap on branch acquisition. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm 
and year. The sample covers the period 1994–2006. Table A2 (see the appendix) provides the definitions for all 
variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
